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Abstract——This paper formulates the action of psy-
chedelics by integrating the free-energy principle and
entropic brain hypothesis. We call this formulation
relaxed beliefs under psychedelics (REBUS) and the
anarchic brain, founded on the principle that—via
their entropic effect on spontaneous cortical activity—
psychedelics work to relax the precision of high-level
priors orbeliefs, thereby liberatingbottom-up information
flow, particularly via intrinsic sources such as the
limbic system. We assemble evidence for this model
and show how it can explain a broad range of phenomena
associated with the psychedelic experience. With regard to
their potential therapeutic use, we propose that psychedelics
work to relax the precision weighting of pathologically
overweighted priors underpinning various expressions of
mental illness. We propose that this process entails an
increased sensitization of high-level priors to bottom-up
signaling (stemming from intrinsic sources), and that this
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heightened sensitivity enables the potential revision and
deweighting of overweighted priors. We end by discussing
further implications of themodel, such as that psychedelics
canbringabout therevisionofotherheavilyweightedhigh-
level priors, not directly related to mental health, such as
those underlying partisan and/or overly-confident political,
religious, and/or philosophical perspectives.
Significance Statement——Psychedelics are capturing
interest,with efforts underway to bringpsilocybin therapy
to marketing authorisation and legal access within a
decade, spearheaded by the findings of a series of phase 2
trials. In this climate, a compelling unified model of how
psychedelics alter brain function to alter consciousness
would have appeal. Towards this end, we have sought to
integrate a leading model of global brain function, hierar-
chical predictive coding, with an often-cited model of the
acute action of psychedelics, the entropic brain hypothesis.
The resulting synthesis states that psychedelics work to
relax high-level priors, sensitising them to liberated bot-
tom-up information flow, which, with the right intention,
care provision and context, can help guide and cultivate
the revision of entrenched pathological priors.
I. Introduction
Psychedelic (mind-manifesting) drugs such as d-lysergic
acid diethylamide (LSD) and psilocybin are capturing
people’s imagination and permeating popular culture on a
scale not seen since the 1960s (Hanks, 2010; Keshavan and
Sudarshan, 2017; Bayne and Carter, 2018; Pollan, 2018).
For those involved in research with these compounds,
it seems likely that they will influence psychology and
psychiatry in amajorway in the coming decades—but there
is stillmuch that is uncertain. In thepresent climate of rapid
development, a compelling unified model of the brain
mechanisms of psychedelics would hold significant value.
In this work, we propose such a unifying model. We
call this relaxed beliefs under psychedelics (REBUS)1
and the anarchic brain or “REBUS” for short. The model
takes inspiration from two formulations of brain func-
tion, namely: 1) the free-energy principle2 (Friston, 2010)
and 2) the entropic brain hypothesis3 (Carhart-Harris,
2018a). The free-energy principle furnishes a unified
description of the behavior of autopoietic or living (i.e.,
self-producing and maintaining) systems—that explains
their development, processing, and behavior based on
their inherent tendency to resist disorder and minimize
uncertainty. This description of (self-evidencing) sys-
tems appeals to their inherent drive to optimize internal
probabilistic representations—and sampling—of their
environments (Friston, 2010). Hierarchical predictive
coding forms a major part of the free-energy principle
and, thus, the REBUSmodel also (see Fig. 1 and also the
Supplemental Glossary for disambiguation of terms).
The entropic brain hypothesis proposes that within
upper and lower bounds, i.e., a critical zone (Hilgetag
and Hutt, 2014), the entropy of spontaneous brain
activity indexes the richness (i.e., the diversity and
vividness) of subjective experience, within any given
state of consciousness, and that psychedelics acutely
increase both (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014; Carhart-
Harris, 2018a). Crucially, both the free-energy and
entropic brain formulations rest on quantifiable mea-
sures from information theory that are apt for empir-
ical study.
The entropic brain hypothesis and free-energy prin-
ciple are inter-related, not least because of their shared
appeal to information theoretical metrics, closely
linked to classic (Shannon) entropy. In its most basic
information-theoretical form, entropy is a dimen-
sionless measure of uncertainty about a dynamical
phenomenon (Ben-Naim, 2007). The entropic brain
measures the uncertainty of neuronal fluctuations across
time, whereas free-energy measures the uncertainty of
beliefs encoded by neuronal fluctuations. The entropic
brain hypothesis proposes that a principal action of
psychedelics is to increase the entropy of spontaneous
brain activity, and that such effects are mirrored at the
subjective level by an increase in the richness of con-
scious experience, assuming that the brain and mind are
flip sides of the same coin, i.e., a position commensu-
rate with so-called “dual aspect monism” (Solms and
Turnbull, 2003).
ABBREVIATIONS: 5-HT2AR, serotonin 2A receptor; BMR, Bayesian model reduction; BMS, Bayesian model selection; DMN, default-mode
network; EEG, electroencephalogram; HPPD, hallucinogen-persisting perceptual disorder; LSD, d-lysergic acid diethylamide; MDMA, 3,4-
methylenedioxy-methamphetamine; MEG, magnetoencephalography; REBUS, relaxed beliefs under psychedelics.
1REBUS is an acronym for “RElaxed Beliefs Under pSychedelics.”
2The phenomenon of free energy, as it relates to brain function, was
first introduced by Karl Friston in 2005 [Friston K (2005) A theory of
cortical responses. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 360(1456):815–36]
and later developed into the “free-energy principle” [Friston K, Kilner J,
Harrison L (2007) A free-energy principle for the brain. J Physiol Paris
100(1–3):70–87]. The free-energy principle is closely related to hierarchical
predictive coding and the Bayesian Brain. For comprehensive texts on
these models, see: (Andy Clark, Surfing Uncertainty) and [Hohwy J (2014)
The Predictive Mind]—and here: [Tappin BM, Gadsby S (2019) Biased
belief in the Bayesian brain: A deeper look at the evidence. Conscious
Cogn 68:107–114] for a useful critique and indication of the robustness of
the model in the context of psychotic delusions. As a simple nontechnical
rule, free energy can be thought of as a measure of surprise. Thus, it is
intimately related to information theoretic entropy, which is a measure of
uncertainty or average surprise.
3The entropic brain hypothesis (EBH) was first introduced in
2014 (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014) and later revisited and updated in
2018 (Carhart-Harris, 2018a). A stern test of the EBH would be to
assess the specificity of the relationship between brain entropy and
richness of conscious content, and one way to do this would be to assess
the question of whether stimulant drugs, which increase arousal but
presumably not conscious content, increase brain entropy. If they do
increase brain entropy (to a similar extent to psychedelics), then this
would contradict and potentially falsify the EBH.
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The entropic brain hypothesis began as a largely
conceptual offering (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014) but
has since been substantiated by a number of empirical
neuroimaging studies and quantitative analyses
(Carhart-Harris, 2018a). It is intended that the neu-
robiological evidence base for the entropic brain hy-
pothesis be supplemented by concomitant measures
of subjective and behavioral complexity/entropy—as
have been applied in the context of development and
ageing (Gauvrit et al., 2017) and natural language
(Hoffman et al., 2013). Thus, the entropic mind and
behavior are natural extensions of the entropic brain
hypothesis.
In this study, we integrate the entropic brain
hypothesis and the free-energy principle framework,
and in particular, exploit the latter’s close links
with predictive processing or coding and the so-called
Bayesian brain hypothesis. Put simply, these closely
related perspectives on brain and mind function
maintain that the brain instantiates, within its
hierarchical architecture, best-guess statistical ap-
proximations (generative models) of the causes
of its sensorium based on Bayesian principles
of empirically informed belief updating (Rao and
Ballard, 1999). Predictive coding is a neuronally
plausible theory for this belief updating—and has
been used to account for a vast range of subjective
and behavioral phenomena: from perceptual illu-
sions in healthy individuals (Zeller et al., 2015) to
a broad number of psychopathological states and
disorders (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Edwards et al.,
2012). In fact, it is reasonable to say that hierarchi-
cal predictive coding now represents the predomi-
nant neurobiological and computational framework
for describing psychological phenomena in health
and disease.
Fig. 1. This schematic illustrates the proposed effects of psychedelics on hierarchical predictive coding, a predominant process theory for Bayesian
inference and variational free-energy minimization in the brain. Under these computational architectures, sensory input arrives at the sensory
epithelia and is compared with descending predictions. The ensuing prediction error (blue circles; e.g., neuronal populations of superficial pyramidal
cells) is then passed forward into hierarchies, to update expectations at higher levels (blue arrows). These posterior expectations (teal circles; e.g., deep
pyramidal cells) then generate predictions of the representations in lower levels, via descending predictions (teal arrows). The recurrent neuronal
message passing (i.e., neuronal dynamics) tries to minimize the amplitude of prediction errors at each and every level of the hierarchy, thereby
furnishing the best explanation for sensory input at multiple levels of hierarchal abstraction. Crucially, this process depends upon the precision
(ascribed importance or salience) afforded to the ascending prediction errors (surprise) and the precision (felt confidence) of posterior beliefs. The basic
idea—pursued in this article—is that psychedelics act preferentially via stimulating 5-HT2ARs on deep pyramidal cells within the visual cortex as well
as at higher levels of the cortical hierarchy. Deep-layer pyramidal neurons are thought to encode posterior expectations, priors, or beliefs. The resulting
disinhibition or sensitization of these units lightens to precision of higher-level expectations so that (by implication of the model) they are more
sensitive to ascending prediction errors (surprise/ascending information), as indicated by the thick blue arrow in the lower panel. Computationally, this
process corresponds to reducing the precision of higher-level prior beliefs and an implicit reduction in the curvature of the free-energy landscape that
contains neuronal dynamics. Effectively, this can be thought of as a flattening of local minima, enabling neuronal dynamics to escape their basins of
attraction and—when in flat minima—express long-range correlations and desynchronized activity. This schematic uses the format in Bastos et al.
(2012), to which the reader is referred for details.
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The present work proposes that a principal action of
classic psychedelics is to relax the precision weighting4
of prior beliefs encoded in the spontaneous activity of
neuronal hierarchies. Statistically, precision is equiv-
alent to inverse variance (i.e., negative entropy), and,
subjectively and intuitively, it can be regarded as
commensurate with felt confidence, i.e., the closer
data are to a given model, the smaller will be our
errors of prediction and thus, the stronger will be our
felt confidence in our model. More specifically, this
study proposes that the effect of this relaxation pro-
cess is felt most profoundly when it occurs at the
highest or deepest level of the brain’s functional
architecture, i.e., the levels that instantiate partic-
ularly high-level models such as those related to self-
hood, identity, or ego.Moreover, as outlined below, due to
the distinct pharmacology of psychedelics—effects at
high or deep levels of the brain’s functional hierarchy
happen quite readily (perhaps definitively so) with
this category of drug, particularly at high doses
(Milliere, 2017).
Functionally, the effect of relaxing the precision
weighting of high-level priors is to create a state in
which these priors are imbued with less confidence.
As just touched on, an important example of a high-
level prior is the belief that one has a particular
personality and set of characteristics and views. This
(umbrella) belief is commensurate with the narra-
tive self (Milliere, 2017) or ego (Carhart-Harris
and Friston, 2010). It is proposed in this work that
dissolving high-level priors has implications for the
functioning of the rest of the hierarchy—and indeed
the integrity of the hierarchy itself. More specifi-
cally, we propose that the general (entropic) action of
psychedelics is to render the brain/mind’s (varia-
tional free) energy landscape flattened or opened up.
It follows from hierarchical predictive coding that
precise high-level priors or beliefs ordinarily have an
important constraining influence on the rest of the
hierarchy, canalizing lower components and inhibit-
ing their expression and influence.
A corollary of relaxing high-level priors or beliefs
under psychedelics is that ascending prediction er-
rors from lower levels of the system (that are ordi-
narily unable to update beliefs due to the top-down
suppressive influence of heavily-weighted priors) can
find freer register in conscious experience, by reach-
ing and impressing on higher levels of the hierarchy.
In this work, we propose that this straightforward
model can account for the full breadth of subjective
phenomena associated with the psychedelic experi-
ence, including the following: ego dissolution (Nour
et al., 2016; Milliere, 2017), the unitive and largely
synonymous peak experience (Roseman et al., 2018b),
near-death-like experiences (Timmermann et al.,
2018), a sense of anxiety and uncertainty (Carhart-
Harris et al., 2014), heightened suggestibility (Carhart-
Harris et al., 2015), sensitivity to context (Carhart-Harris
et al., 2018c), emotional lability (Carhart-Harris et al.,
2016b), insight (Carbonaro et al., 2018), paranoid and
delusional thinking (Carhart-Harris et al., 2016b),
psychological age regression and vivid autobio-
graphical recollection (Grof, 1979), recourse to mag-
ical thinking (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014), altered
time perception (Wackermann et al., 2008), a sense
of the ineffable (Pollan, 2018), entity encounters and
sensed presence (Timmermann et al., 2018), eyes-
closed dreamlike visions (de Araujo et al., 2012),
geometric hallucinations (Bressloff et al., 2002), and
more.
The hypothesized flattening of the brain’s (varia-
tional free) energy landscape5 under psychedelics
can be seen as analogous to the phenomenon of
simulated annealing in computer science—which
itself is analogous to annealing in metallurgy,
whereby a system is heated (i.e., instantiated by
increased neural excitability), such that it attains a
state of heightened plasticity, in which the discov-
ery of new energy minima (relatively stable places/
trajectories for the system to visit/reside in for a
period of time) is accelerated (Wang and Smith, 1998).
Subsequently, as the drug is metabolized and the
system cools, its dynamics begin to stabilize—and
attractor basins begin to steepen again (Carhart-
Harris et al., 2017). This process may result in the
emergence of a new energy landscape with revised
properties (Fig. 1).
Within the transient hot state of a psychedelic expe-
rience, a flattened landscape implies that attracting
brain states (and accompanying mind states) encod-
ing beliefs are less stable and influential, implying
that interstate transitions can occur more freely.
Thus, rather than the mind and brain being con-
strained to a small number of gravitationally domi-
nant attractors (i.e., states or sequence of states), the
mind and brain spontaneously transition between states
with greater freedom—and in a less predictable way.
These altered dynamics may be felt as an enriched or
broadened global state of consciousness—and a sense of
4Precision is formally inverse variance and can be thought of as
synonymous with felt confidence.
5Technically, a loss of precision (confidence) in posterior beliefs
corresponds to a decrease in the curvature or flattening of the free-
energy landscape associated with the neuronal activity encoding
those beliefs. Free-energy minimization effectively tries to find flat
minima in accord with Occam’s principle and Jayne’s principle of
maximum entropy (Jaynes, 1957). Interestingly, the problem of sharp
minima is still an area of active research in machine learning
(Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997) Flat minima lend neuronal
activity a latitude for fluctuations that characteristically result in
critical slowing, of the sort entailed by the entropic brain hypothesis.
The “slow” in critical slowing can be thought of as a slow recovery
from a perturbation, i.e., the system has a slower recovery rate. See
Friston et al. (2012a) for a technical discussion.
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the mind opening up (Atasoy et al., 2017). Equally,
however, they may be felt as aversive and disconcert-
ing (Carhart-Harris et al., 2016b), especially given that
small perturbations to the system can have large
repercussions in such a flattened energy landscape,
e.g., see the related themes of context sensitivity
(Carhart-Harris et al., 2018c) and critical slowing
(Cocchi et al., 2017); see Fig. 2.
Under psychedelics, one can view global brain func-
tion as entering a mode or state that: 1) features a
lightening or relaxation of the precision weighting on
priors and 2) allows for a (potentially enduring) re-
vision of such priors, via the release of prediction error
that impacts on the sensitized priors. Empirically,6
findings of an enriched repertoire of connectivity
motifs (Tagliazucchi et al., 2014) and connectome
harmonics under psychedelics (Atasoy et al., 2017)
may be seen as consistent with the notion of a
flattened energy landscape under these drugs. We
also go further to speculate that the influence of
previously dominant attractors—including those
that may be pathologic—perhaps erected in re-
sponse to trauma-related uncertainty or ambiguity,
whether acute or chronic (Carhart-Harris, 2019),
may be relaxed in an enduring way after successful
psychedelic therapy, potentially accounting for the
so-called afterglow period (Majic et al., 2015) and
beyond.
In brief, our proposal is that psychedelics dis-
rupt functioning at a level of the system (sensitivity
of deep-layer pyramidal neurons, power of low-
frequency rhythms, and integrity of large-scale net-
works) that encodes the precision of priors, beliefs, or
assumptions. At low doses, subjective effects may be
felt most tangibly at the perceptual level and par-
ticularly within the visual domain [serotonin 2A
Fig. 2. These schematics depict: on the top row, brain organization in psychopathologies such as depression in which high-level
priors (e.g., instantiated by the DMN) are overweighted (thick top-down arrow), causing a suppression of and insensitivity to bottom-up
signaling (e.g., stemming from the limbic system). In this figure, we show compromised bottom-up signaling via a thin arrow with a red
cross over its center. The graphic on the top right depicts a pathologically rigid or frozen system, insensitive to perturbation, represented
in this figure as a heavy ball dropped on a solid surface having a minimal effect on the system, i.e., the ball lands with an uneventful
thud. The bottom row depicts brain organization under a psychedelic. In this figure, the top-down arrow has been made translucent to
reflect a deweighting or relaxation of high-level priors or beliefs (this component of the model is referred to by the acronym REBUS).
The effect of this deweighting is to enable bottom-up information intrinsic to the system, to travel up the hierarchy with greater latitude
and compass. We refer to this component of the model as the anarchic brain. That the two brains on the bottom row are on the same level and
of the same size is intended to reflect a generalized decrease in hierarchical constraints under the psychedelic. The graphic on the
bottom right represents a phenomenon known as critical slowing, i.e., systems at criticality display maximal sensitivity to perturbation.
In this figure, one can see ripples appearing after a heavy ball is dropped into a liquid surface, reflecting how, in this particular system,
and unlike its frozen counterpart above, there will be a slow recovery to the same perturbation. Illustrations by Pedro Oliveira, courtesy of
Favo Studio.
6Physiologically, precision is thought to be encoded by the
sensitivity or postsynaptic gain of neuronal populations encoding
predictions and prediction errors. Generally, a loss of precision
corresponds to an increased sensitivity to afferent, presynaptic input.
In turn, this enables revision or updating of beliefs that are
neuronally encoded. See Kanai et al. (2015).
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receptor (5-HT2ARs) are richly expressed within the
visual cortex], but at higher doses, effects will
become more profound as the functioning of higher
levels of the global hierarchy become significantly
disrupted, potentially accounting for phenomena
such as the dissolution of ego boundaries7 and potential
(long-term) revision of high-level priors, perspectives, or
beliefs.
Mechanisms of simulated annealing, the destruction
of sharp minima, and Bayesian model reduction
(BMR) can be raised in this work (and in more detail
later on) to account for the rapid, marked, and
enduring belief changes that can be seen after (high-
dose) psychedelic experience (Friston et al., 2017;
Lyons and Carhart-Harris, 2018a)—and upon which
the growing evidence for psychedelic therapy is based
(Carhart-Harris and Goodwin, 2017; Rucker et al.,
2018). We propose that many, if not most, psychopa-
thologies develop via the gradual (or rapid—in the
case of acute trauma) entrenchment of pathologic
thoughts and behaviors, plus aberrant beliefs held
at a high level, e.g., in the form of negative self-
perception and/or fearful, pessimistic, and sometimes
paranoid outlooks. We also propose that these path-
ologic beliefs are ascribed excessive precision, weight,
or influence in many psychiatric disorders (Clark
et al., 2018). This view overlaps somewhat with the
so-called capture theory of mental suffering (Kessler,
2016) as well as Bayesian perspectives on delusional
belief formation in psychosis (Adams et al., 2018;
Sterzer et al., 2018).
The process of capture (Kessler, 2016) or tightening
of beliefs (and behaviors) in uncertainty (Carhart-
Harris, 2019) may begin with psychological injury
(Hovens et al., 2015; Peters et al., 2017)8 and
then develop progressively, likely as an (functional)
attempt to mitigate the averseness of felt uncer-
tainty or ambiguity brought on by the relevant
shock(s) and/or psychological injury or injuries.
In this sense, the creation of the aberrant belief is
self-protective and defensive (i.e., it is a coping
mechanism), and, although pathologic, it may work
to reduce an individual’s felt uncertainty. Indeed,
as a strategy for suppressing uncertainty, even
aberrant belief formation is consistent with the
uncertainty-resolving imperatives of the free-energy
principle. However, because the relevant defensive
belief(s) becomes defining of pathology, it follows
that it must be revised to avoid becoming
entrenched and thus resistant to treatment. More-
over, because the belief(s) is self-protective, it is
natural that psychological resistance will be felt if
its integrity is threatened, e.g., pharmacologically
via a psychedelic, or in the context of psychodynamic
psychotherapy. It also follows that the precision
weighting of the relevant high-level prior(s) or
beliefs must first be relaxed, before they can be
revised, and that a safe container for such a potentially
destabilizing process is essential (Carhart-Harris
et al., 2018c).
The ideal result of the process of belief relaxation
and revision is a recalibration of the relevant beliefs
so that they may better align or harmonize with
other levels of the system and with bottom-up
information—whether originating from within (e.g.,
via lower-level intrinsic systems and related inter-
oception) or, at lower doses, outside the individual
(i.e., via sensory input or extroception). Such func-
tional harmony or realignment may look like a system
better able to guide thought and behavior in an
open, unguarded way (Watts et al., 2017; Carhart-
Harris et al., 2018b). In what follows, we offer some
speculations on how the proposed top heaviness un-
derpinning much psychopathology9 is biologically in-
stantiated in the human brain—and potentially
relieved by psychedelic therapy.
This work will endeavor to account for a broad
range of phenomena associated with the psychedelic
experience by first presenting the neurobiological
case for the hypothesis that the precision weighting
of beliefs is relaxed under these compounds (REBUS).
We then focus on the phenomenology of the psyche-
delic experience and its consequences—and how
this ties in with the relevant neurobiology. We hope
to explain how a potential relaxation of the preci-
sion weighting of high-level priors or beliefs and
subsequent opening up of mental content under a
psychedelic is logically implied by our two main
guiding formulations: the entropic brain hypothesis
and the free-energy principle. An important comple-
mentary theme, inspired by the so-called algorith-
mic information theory account of consciousness
(Ruffini, 2017), is that the brain’s highest levels
naturally envelope the content of levels below,
7Note: we do not differentiate between different types of ego
dissolution. For example, it has been argued that ego dissolution can
be as follows: 1) incomplete: due to psychological resistance and/or
insufficient drug dose, ensuing ego dissolution is experienced as a
state of high anxiety and distress or 2) complete: felt as a state of
complete surrender, associated bliss, and union with all things. We
are currently developing a relevant emotional breakthrough in-
ventory rating scale to better differentiate between these two types of
ego dissolution. An argument could be made that only the latter is
true ego dissolution, as it is an almost binary, qualitative
phenomenon, i.e., it either happens or it does not. It is obviously of
interest to better understand the neuronal correlates of these distinct
experiences. Perhaps relevantly, recent positron–emission tomogra-
phy imaging of 5-HT2AR occupancy and its relationship to subjective
effects supports the assumption that the dose–response curve for
psychedelics is nonlinear: Madsen et al. (2019).
8Not discounting the relevance of differential sensitivities or
vulnerabilities to the effects of injury, such as the role of genetic risk
factors.
9And perhaps individuals living within technologically and in-
dustrially advanced societies.
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thereby effectively suppressing their potential infor-
mation content via the action of a summary model.10
Such models are referred to as compressive because
they compress the content of levels below, effectively
causing their content to disappear or at least not be
heard. By implication, the breakdown of a compres-
sive model should have an expansive influence on the
system’s potential information content, as it would
liberate suppressed information, enabling it to travel
up through the hierarchy, impressing on higher levels
as it does.
Our empirically informed theoretical treatment
of psychedelics begins with a review of their phar-
macology and associated behavioral research, both
in animals and humans, making special reference
to synaptic efficacy-enhancing effects (Ly et al.,
2018). We then address the important relation-
ship between their key pharmacological action,
namely, 5-HT2AR agonism and sensitivity to con-
text (Carhart-Harris et al., 2018c). We place special
emphasis on the interaction between perceived (or
actual) environmental volatility, associated stress,
upregulation of 5-HT2AR functioning, and associ-
ated plasticity.
We argue that this upregulation of 5-HT2AR
functioning facilitates adaptability to environmental
volatility (Carhart-Harris and Nutt, 2017). This
property has also been attributed to other neuro-
modulatory systems, such as noradrenaline and ace-
tylcholine (Yu andDayan, 2002, 2005), but it may be an
especially pronounced feature of the 5-HT2AR system
(Carhart-Harris and Nutt, 2017). We then turn to
functional brain-imaging studies with psychedelics
and what these tell us about the acute action of
psychedelics and their potential longer-term effects.
We conclude by focusing on recent evidence supporting
the therapeutic potential of psychedelics and offer a
unified account of their acute and therapeutic mecha-
nisms based on an integration of the entropic brain
hypothesis and free-energy principle.
II. The REBUS Model
A. The Basic Neuropharmacology of Psychedelics
Some classic psychedelics, such as LSD, have a rich
pharmacology (Nichols, 2004, 2016); however, there
is compelling evidence that activation of a specific
serotonin receptor subtype, the 5-HT2AR, is neces-
sary for these compounds’ subsequent psychedelic
effects. The affinity of psychedelics for the 5-HT2AR
correlates strongly with their subjective and behav-
ioral potency in humans and animals (Glennon et al.,
1992), and pretreatment with 5-HT2AR antagonists
markedly attenuates their characteristic psychologi-
cal effects in humans (Vollenweider et al., 1998).11
The 5-HT2ARs are expressed most densely in the
cortex and especially in high-level association re-
gions, such as those belonging to the so-called
default-mode network (DMN) (Beliveau et al., 2017).
Recently, it was found that 5-HT2AR occupancy and
plasma concentration of psilocin (the active metabo-
lite of psilocybin) correlate with psilocybin’s subjec-
tive effects—in a nonlinear way that matches the
nonlinear nature of psychological phenomena such as
ego dissolution (Madsen et al., 2019).
The DMN is a high-level brain network that is
exceptional for a number of reasons, including: 1)
its high basal metabolism (Raichle, 2015), 2) dense
interregional connectivity (Hagmann et al., 2008),
3) extreme heteromodality (Margulies et al., 2016),
and 4) association with functionally high-level
behaviors—falling broadly under the constructs of
perspective taking and metacognition (Soto et al.,
2018). The DMN has been associated with arguably
species-defining behaviors such as mental time tra-
vel (Ostby et al., 2012), moral decision making
(Kaplan et al., 2017), counter-factual thinking (Van
Hoeck et al., 2013), and self-consciousness (Fingelkurts
et al., 2012). Some years ago, we nominated the DMN
as the primary biologic substrate of the Freudian ego
(Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010), as well as a vital
system for the maintenance of secondary process
cognition (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014). With some
qualifications (Lebedev et al., 2015) and an acknowl-
edgment of the looseness of this attributional exercise
(mainly due to the intrinsic abstraction of the con-
structs in question, which is a challenge to surmount),
we still largely maintain these views (see also Davey
et al., 2016; Davey and Harrison, 2018). In simpler,
more mechanistic terms, however, the human DMN
can be considered to sit at the top end—or center—
of a uniquely deep hierarchical system, i.e., the
human brain, instantiating a uniquely deep and
10Technically, this imperative is identical to that used in pre-
dictive coding and variational free-energy minimization, namely, the
compression of information via the minimization of redundancy or
complexity (Hinton and Zemel, 1993; MacKay, 1995; Schmidhuber,
2010).
11For a more detailed account of the specific signalling pathways
engaged by psychedelics, see Marek (2018) and [López-Giménez JF,
González-Maeso J (2018) Hallucinogens and serotonin 5-HT(2A)
receptor-mediated signaling pathways. Curr Top Behav Neurosci 36:
45–73]. Do note that these signalling pathways are complex as it is
still not yet fully clear which signalling pathway or combination of
them is necessary and sufficient for a psychedelic drug’s typical
effects to manifest. There is also the phenomenon of functional
selectivity to consider, i.e., that psychedelics appear to activate
5-HT2ARs in a different way to the endogenous ligand, 5-HT
[González-Maeso J, Sealfon SC. Agonist-trafficking and hallucino-
gens. Curr Med Chem 16(8):1017–27]. The context and location of the
5-HT2AR–expressing neuron also needs to be factored in, e.g., highly
5-HT2AR–expressing deep-layer pyramidal neurons appear to be
those that are most likely to be directly activated by psychedelics
[Martin DA, Nichols CD (2016) Psychedelics recruit multiple cellular
types and produce complex transcriptional responses within the
brain. EBioMedicine 11:262–277].
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domain-general model of the embodied agent his- or
herself (Friston, 2018; Friston et al., 2018). See
Becker (2011) for a reminder of the unique depth of
human mental models and their psychological and
sociological implications.
An important aspect of the present thesis is that the
potential belief-revising effects of psychedelics occur
via an action on the top end (or deepest aspect) of the
brain’s functional architecture, with high-level cortex
being particularly implicated. This high-end locus of
action is supported by the especially dense expression
of 5-HT2ARs within high-level cortex (Beliveau et al.,
2017). Functional disintegration of the DMN12 and
changes in other high-level networks (Lebedev et al.,
2015; Tagliazucchi et al., 2016) have been linked
with the most abstract phenomenological features of
the psychedelic experience, such as ego dissolution
(Carhart-Harris et al., 2016c); however, we also pro-
pose that the pronounced perceptual effects of psyche-
delics involve effects both within and above the relevant
sensory modules. Consistent with the free-energy prin-
ciple, we propose that the brain’s highest levels provide
an implicit, centralizing, and generalized compres-
sion of (potential) information held within and pro-
cessed by subordinate levels; i.e., the high or deep
hierarchical levels furnish beliefs about abstract,
domain-general narratives regarding the world qual-
ities of self and states of being. Moreover, these beliefs
also offer the best explanation for inferences at lower
levels (Ruffini, 2017), a rule that also applies to the
extensive architecture dedicated to perceptual infer-
ence (Gregory, 1980). Relatedly, although the DMN
is characteristically far removed from immediate
sensory processing (Margulies et al., 2016), evidence
suggests that it contextualizes sensory processing,
particularly in the visual modality (Huang and
Sereno, 2013; Griffis et al., 2017), suggesting there
is little that is beyond the reach of the DMN (even if its
influence is somewhat detached), which is what one
would expect from a particularly high-level compo-
nent of a system, i.e., an exceptionally broad executive
reach or influence.
It is hypothesized that disrupting the broad com-
pressive function of the DMN and related high-level
networks has trickle-down effects on the functional
organization of the global system. In addition to
the brain’s highest hierarchical levels, we highlight
how intermediate hierarchical levels (i.e., those con-
cerned with cognition, perception, and emotion) are
likely to be affected by psychedelics. Although this
rule may be true for much of the brain, the operation
of its most rudimentary, domain-specific levels (e.g.,
those concerned with motor and autonomic functions)
may remain largely immune from the influence of
psychedelics—at least on an implementation level.
For example, under the effects of a high dose of a
psychedelic, an individual may report feeling as if
they cannot move, vocalize, or even breathe properly,
but, in practice, they can typically perform these
functions almost as normal.
1. Interim Summary. Consistent with hierarchical
predictive processing, we maintain that the highest
level of the brain’s functional architecture ordinar-
ily exerts an important constraining and compressing
influence on perception, cognition, and emotion, so
that perceptual anomalies and ambiguities—as well as
dissonance and incongruence—are easily and effort-
lessly explained away via the invocation of broad,
domain-general compressive narratives. In this work,
we suggest that psychedelics impair this compressive
function, resulting in a decompression of the mind-at-
large—and that this is their most definitive mind-
manifesting action.
One cannot discount the possibility that a direct
disruption of priors instantiated by lower levels of the
functional hierarchy occurs with psychedelics, and,
indeed, an intermediate-level locus of action is sup-
ported by the predominant expression of 5-HT2ARs
on layer 5 pyramidal neurons throughout much of
the cortex, e.g., with particularly high expression
within the primary visual cortex (Beliveau et al.,
2017). This said, we still maintain that the espe-
cially high expression of 5-HT2ARs within high-level
cortex is likely to be important. Moreover, this
hierarchical view is consistent with the functional
(hierarchical and recurrent message passing) asym-
metries on which predictive coding depends. In short,
although an intermediate action of psychedelics is
plausible—if not likely—dysregulation of the highest
hierarchical level may be the definitive action of
psychedelics. See Pink-Hashkes et al. (2017) for
discussion of a related and largely consistent hierar-
chical predictive-processing–based model of the ac-
tion of psychedelics.
To illustrate this point, consider the example of
hallucinated motion, e.g., perceiving motion in scenes
that are actually static, such as seeing walls breath-
ing, a classic experience with moderate doses of
psychedelics. This phenomenon can be fairly viewed
as relatively low level, i.e., as an anomaly of visual
perception. However, we propose that its basis in the
brain is not necessarily entirely low-level but may
also arise due to an inability of high-level cortex to
effectively constrain the relevant lower levels of the
(visual) system. These levels include cortical regions
that send information to V5, the motion-sensitive
module of the visual system. Ordinarily, the assump-
tion “walls don’t breathe” is so heavily weighted that it
is rendered implicit (and therefore effectively silent) by a
confident (highly-weighted) summarizing prior or com-
pressive model. However, under a psychedelic, V5 may be
12We use the metric of within-network functional connectivity as
an index of integrity within the DMN here.
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forced to interpret increased signaling arising from
lower-level units because of a functional negligence,
not just within V5 itself, but also higher up in the
hierarchy. Findings of impaired high- but not low-level
motion perception with psilocybin could be interpreted
as broadly consistent with this model, namely, pinning
the main source of disruption high up in the brain’s
functional hierarchy (Carter et al., 2004). The excep-
tionally high expression of 5-HT2ARs in the brain’s
highest hierarchical levels provides a solid anatomic
basis for this assumption, although we recognize
expression is also particularly high in the primary
visual cortex (Beliveau et al., 2017). Finally, the
predominantly high-level expression of 5-HT2ARs
might also explain the phenomenon of microdosing,
namely, the taking of subsensory-perceptible doses of
psychedelics that nevertheless (allegedly) produce a
discernible cognitive/emotional effect (Waldman,
2017)—presumably again, through a (subtle) flatten-
ing of the brain’s functional hierarchy and associated
(subtle) increase in bottom-up signaling.
B. Rhythms, Networks, and the Relaxation of
High-Level Priors
Activation of 5-HT2ARs induces an increase in
excitatory postsynaptic currents and discharge rates
in pyramidal neurons (Celada et al., 2008), causing an
asynchronous mode of glutamate release (Aghajanian
and Marek, 1999), also known as recurrent network
activity (Aghajanian, 2009), and temporal dissociation
between cortical pyramidal cell firing and the active
phase of local field potentials, i.e., a spike-field deco-
herence (Celada et al., 2008). This irregular excitation
of deep-layer pyramidal neurons is likely to account
for the highly reliable finding of psychedelic-induced
decreases in oscillatory activity (particularly in its
most prominent frequency bands, such as alpha) in
animal and human cortex (Muthukumaraswamy et al.,
2013; Riga et al., 2014), a view that is substantiated by
our application of dynamic causal modeling to psilocy-
bin magnetoencephalography (MEG) data, which im-
plicated layer 5 pyramidal neuron excitation as the
cause of broadband decreases in oscillatory power
(Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2013). From the perspec-
tive of predictive coding, these selective effects on deep
pyramidal cells are particularly prescient because
these populations are thought to encode expectations
about the latent or hidden causes of the sensorium.
Rendering them selectively more sensitive to ascend-
ing input (e.g., prediction errors) is precisely the
neuromodulatory change that reduces the precision
weighting of the expectations they encode. In other
words, being more excitable is the physiologic mecha-
nism that destroys sharp minima and underwrites a
weakening of prior expectations.
It is well known that the brain’s resting power spec-
trum exhibits stark nonuniformities in its oscillatory
components, in the sense that certain rhythms are
especially pronounced. This seems to be particularly
the case when recording population-level activity
in the cortex. Perhaps the most conspicuous example
of a predominant rhythm is the a rhythm or Berger
wave of about 10 Hz, which shows a striking promi-
nence, especially, but by no means exclusively, during
eyes-closed waking rest. The a rhythm has been
associated with a range of functions, including top-
down inhibition (Klimesch et al., 2007). Evidence
has been accumulating, however, that a also plays a
more specific role in conferring top-down expectations
about perceptual stimuli (Mayer et al., 2016) that
effectively silence more granular information pro-
cessed by lower-level aspects of the system. The a
power is known to correlate positively with DMN
activity (Mantini et al., 2007), as does b (Mantini
et al., 2007). Like alpha, the b rhythm has also been
associated with a top-down function, albeit within the
motor system (Fries, 2015).
Another interpretation of a is that it is associated
with a resting, reflective brain that responds—
electrophysiologically speaking—with the emergence
of higher frequencies on stimulation. This is known as
event-related desynchronization (Pfurtscheller et al.,
1996; Singh et al., 2002) and typically involves a shift
to broadband activity. In brief, high a activity would
appear to correspond to a neurophysiological state
of low entropy and strong or precise (i.e., heavily-
weighted) top-down constraints—as maintained by
the free-energy principle (Boly et al., 2012; Bauer
et al., 2014; Bastos et al., 2015).
Crucially, psychedelics have been found to dramati-
cally decrease prominent low-frequency and therefore
high-level brain rhythms such as a and b, and this effect
appears to be both reliable and closely related to the
intensity of their subjective effects (Muthukumaraswamy
et al., 2013; Carhart-Harris et al., 2016c). Perhaps
relatedly, psychedelics have also been found to tune
brain activity closer to criticality (Atasoy et al., 2017;
Muthukumaraswamy and Liley, 2018; Varley et al., 2019),
such that it displays more of a scale-free organization
(Muthukumaraswamy and Liley, 2018), an effect thatmay
be mediated by a modulation (Muthukumaraswamy and
Liley, 2018).
Using MEG, we found reduced a power in the
posterior cingulate cortex under psychedelics, a major
node of the DMN, and this effect correlated significantly
with subjective ratings of ego dissolution under both
psilocybin (Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2013) and LSD
(Carhart-Harris et al., 2016c). The a rhythm is known
to be especially highly expressed in humans relative
to other animals, and especially so during maturity,
with a peak at about 20 years of age (Basar and
Guntekin, 2009), which, intriguingly, is approxi-
mately when the complexity of cognition has been
found to be maximal (Gauvrit et al., 2017). Although
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open to critique, a curious cross-cultural electroen-
cephalogram (EEG) study sampling eyes-closed brain
activity in more than 400 individuals has reported
that a is most pronounced in the most technologically
advanced and developed cultures (Parameshwaran
and Thiagarajan, 2017).
1. Interim Summary. To summarize, evidence that
psychedelics have a particular action on high-level
cellular, oscillatory, and regional/network features of
the brain’s functional architecture, combined with
evidence that these features are implicated in a top-
down predictive function, converges on a key hypothesis
of this work, namely, that psychedelics have an impor-
tant dysregulatory effect on the highest levels of the
brain, subverting the brain’s ability to entrain and
constrain emotion and perception to a central narrative:
“The Centre cannot hold.” (Yeats, 1865–1939)
We maintain that the hierarchically high-level charac-
ter of key sites of action of psychedelics, e.g., 5-HT2ARs
on deep-layer pyramidal neurons in high-level cortex/
systems, is important, and that activation of these
receptors renders the high-level components on which
they sit, sensitized and functionally dysregulated. We
propose that this dysregulation of the highest levels of
the brain’s functional hierarchy is commensurate with a
lightening of the precision weighting encoded by these
levels and their associated dynamics. The effect of this,
we propose, is to lighten the top heaviness of human
cognition, by (temporarily) flattening the hierarchical
organization that supports it. Although speculative, the
alleged positive mood and procognitive effects of micro-
dosing may depend on the same (temporary) antihier-
archical effect, liberating brain and mind function,
albeit with far greater subtlety than with higher doses.
At the other extreme, the sense of losing one’s self or
ego with higher doses of psychedelics may explain why
one can feel as if one is dying while under the effects of
these drugs (Timmermann et al., 2018), despite the fact
that peripheral physiology remains largely unaffected.
Living systems adhere to the free-energy principle but
dying systems do not (Friston, 2018). Indeed, a dying
or dead brain/body is the very epitome of an entropic
brain/body. The so-called entropic brain effect (Carhart-
Harris, 2018a), exemplified by findings of increased
brain complexity/entropy (Schartner et al., 2017) and
decreased modular differentiation (Petri et al., 2014),
provides an iconic image of dysregulated global brain
function under psychedelics, with the 5-HT2AR as the
trigger point.
C. Plasticity and the Dissolution of (High-Level) Priors
under Psychedelics
In this section, we address neurobiological and be-
havioral evidence for the hypothesis that psychedelics
work byweakening the precisionweighting of high-level
priors and, thus, their ability to exert hierarchical control
over and be impervious to the influence of lower-level
components of the brain. Readers will note that psyche-
delics appear to affect predictive processing at a broad
range of functional levels. It is our view that psychedelics
affect not just high-level priors but intermediate-level
priors also (e.g., those instantiated within the visual
cortex). However, we maintain that the relaxation of
precision on the high hierarchical levels has the most
dramatic psychological consequences. One reason for this
may be that these high levels encode cognition at a level of
abstraction that is more removed from the (anchoring and
entraining influence of) statistical regularities within the
sensorium—and so are more able to change or undergo
revision. Another reason why disruption at the highest
levels may have special implications is that these high
levels support domain-nonspecific narratives that influ-
ence the entire hierarchy. The principle is that the
influence of the high levels runs deep, such that affecting
them has particularly large or general implications.
Returning to a lower level, a recent study used
optogenetics in mice to selectively measure the activity
of serotonergic cells within the dorsal raphe nuclei
(Matias et al., 2017). The authors found that dorsal raphe
nuclei cell firing increased significantly under conditions
of uncertainty, being sensitive to surprising events irre-
spective of their reward value (i.e., value-nonspecific pre-
diction error). The authors inferred from these results that
serotonin transmission plays an important role in enhanc-
ing adaptability in the face of uncertainty, a theme that
chimeswell with themodelwe are presenting in thiswork,
as well as another presented recently (Carhart-Harris and
Nutt, 2017), which specifically associates 5-HT2AR signal-
ing with enhanced adaptability, particularly in situations
of crisis. Thus, understanding the REBUS/anarchic brain
model may have important implications for our under-
standing of brain serotonin function (Carhart-Harris and
Nutt, 2017), a notable enigma in psychopharmacology.
The role of serotonin (Matias et al., 2017) and, more
specifically, 5-HT2AR signaling (Boulougouris et al.,
2008), in cognitive flexibility, has been substantiated by
numerous studies in animals and humans, e.g., see
Carhart-Harris and Nutt (2017) for a review. Psyche-
delics have been found to promote divergent thinking
(Kuypers et al., 2016)—a key component of creative
thinking—as well as an expansion of associative pro-
cessing (Spitzer et al., 1996), while (unsurprisingly)
impairing conventional cognition (Bayne and Carter,
2018), including convergent/discriminatory cognition
(Kuypers et al., 2016). Recent (Berthoux et al., 2018;
Ly et al., 2018) and older work (Vaidya et al., 1997)
provide convincing evidence that 5-HT2AR signaling
can enhance neural plasticity, as well as low-level
learning and extinction learning, as reviewed in this
study (Carhart-Harris and Nutt, 2017), suggesting that
psychedelics promote a generalized plasticity via their
agonist actions at the 5-HT2AR (Carhart-Harris et al.,
2016b; Carhart-Harris and Nutt, 2017).
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Serotonin transmission is known to play an impor-
tant role in normal brain development (Azmitia, 2001;
Maya Vetencourt et al., 2008) and has been increas-
ingly linked to enhanced sensitivity to environmental
influences (Branchi, 2011; Alboni et al., 2017). Re-
latedly, psychedelics appear to induce a regressive
state, both behaviorally (Grof, 1979) and in terms of
brain function (Roseman et al., 2014; Carhart-Harris
et al., 2016c). Moreover, as in infancy, the influence of
context has an exaggerated role under psychedelics
(Carhart-Harris et al., 2018c), a characteristic prop-
erty of critical systems13 linked to critical slowing14
(see section II.F.3. Criticality and Optimality for
further discussion of the theme of criticality). It is
also worth noting that 5-HT2AR densities are highest
early in life, dropping significantly when adulthood is
reached (Sheline et al., 2002). Behavioral complexity
also decreases at a similar age, after peaking at about
25 years of age (Gauvrit et al., 2017). Lastly, that both
children and individuals on psychedelics are hyper-
suggestible (Nicolas et al., 2011; Carhart-Harris
et al., 2015) is consistent with the principle that brain
activity is tuned closer to criticality in these—likely
related—brain states.
Taken together, the above-cited findings speak to
the notion that the brain enters an entropic hot state
under psychedelics in which synaptic efficacy and
plasticity are elevated (Ly et al., 2018). The result
of this window of exceptionally high plasticity may be
to leave a legacy of potentially enduring functional
and perhaps anatomic change (Ly et al., 2018). As the
acute drug effects begin to subside, the system (brain)
will settle back into its default regimen of efficient
free-energy minimization, mirrored by a renewed
subjective sense of familiarity and assuredness, but
may not return entirely as before.
Recent functional imaging work with psyche-
delics suggests that large-scale intrinsic brain net-
works, such as the DMN, do indeed reintegrate after a
psychedelic experience (Carhart-Harris et al., 2017).
It is tempting to speculate that profound psychedelic
experiences have a residual impact on the DMN,
perhaps pruning some of its (redundant) parameters,
in a manner that is consistent with synaptic homoeo-
stasis and BMR (Tononi and Cirelli, 2006; Friston
et al., 2017). Psychedelics may also lighten the pre-
cision weighting of DMN-related high-level priors in
an enduring way. Further work is needed to test these
hypotheses; however, we anticipate that long-term
changes in DMN functioning may account for common
reports of a lighter, freer state of mind after intense
psychedelic experiences (Watts et al., 2017), particu-
larly in the context of psychedelic therapy. This
postacute period of well-being is often referred to as
the psychedelic afterglow (Sampedro et al., 2017) and
has been described in various ways: “I felt free,
carefree, re-energized” (Watts et al., 2017); “The
concrete coat had come off” (Watts et al., 2017); “All
that day and well into the next, a high pressure
system of well-being dominated my psychological
weather” (Pollan, 2018).15
D. Behavioral Evidence of Relaxed Priors
under Psychedelics
The relaxation of the precision weighting of high-
level priors under psychedelics is a central theme
of the REBUS model. But what behavioral evidence
is there for the implicit dissolution of prior beliefs?
Although not directly concerned with high-level
priors,16 one place we may find some relevant data is
perceptual processing and, specifically, oddball para-
digms such as the mismatch negativity, which di-
rectly engages predictive coding mechanisms (Garrido
et al., 2009), and the engagement of lower-level priors
and sensory prediction error. Using auditory mis-
match negativity during MEG scanning, a blunted
surprise response to deviant tones was found under
LSD relative to placebo, as was reduced neuronal
adaptation (Timmermann et al., 2017). This result
makes sense based on the principle that psychedelics
weaken expectations about standard tones in this
paradigm, thus making deviant tones seem less anom-
alous or surprising. Using dynamical causal model-
ing, it was apparent that the diminished surprise
signals could be best accounted for by reduced
top-down information flow from the frontal cortex
(Timmermann et al., 2017)—again consistent with
the REBUS model of relaxed priors under psyche-
delics. Also consistent are findings from a study that
measured visual evoked responses to Kanisza trian-
gles, a visual perceptual illusion requiring object
completion via top-down perceptual priors. Results
13The “critical” here refers to a “critical point” in a phase transition
between order and disorder in which interesting emergent phenom-
ena such as critical slowing become evident; Chialvo (2010).
14Critical slowing refers to a property of critical systems in which
they are especially sensitive to perturbation. The term slowing refers
to the property of being slow to recover from the perturbation—
analogous to a pebble causing persistent ripples on the surface of a
lake—versus, e.g., a pebble having little impact on a thickly frozen
(subcritical) lake.
15Ketamine has similarly been shown to have a rapid mood-lifting
effect in depression; however, its ability to engender lasting
psychological changes does not appear to be equivalent to that of
the classic psychedelics. More work is needed to ascertain why this is
the case, but one possibility is that (perhaps due to an absence of a
significant gradient in the cortical–subcortical N-methyl-D-aspartate
receptor profile) ketamine does not subvert hierarchical message
passing in quite the same way as psychedelics, and thus the release
of (precise) bottom-up influences on sensitized high-level priors—
leading to their long-term revision—is less evident with ketamine.
Relatedly, ketamine may not engage insight-related processes in the
same way as classic psychedelics appear to.
16Indeed, there is comparatively little research on psychedelics
affecting truly higher-level priors, although we looking to rectify this.
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revealed reduced object completion and related
evoked potentials under psilocybin (Kometer et al.,
2011), and these effects correlated with the intensity
of spontaneous visual hallucinations. Another visual
perceptual phenomenon that probes predictive cod-
ing is binocular rivalry, in which the presentation of
two different visual stimuli to each eye typically
induces the alternation between one percept and
another. Under psilocybin, participants were more
likely to perceive mixed percepts, and switch between
them, consistent with reduced perceptual constraints,
presumably due to impaired top-down resolution of
perceptual uncertainty (Carter et al., 2005, 2007). A
number of other studies have demonstrated reduced
prepulse inhibition under psychedelics (Quednow
et al., 2012; Schmid et al., 2015) and a 5-HT2AR–
mediated augmentation of the startle response
(Jiang et al., 2011), consistent with reduced top-
down sensory inhibition or gating (Vollenweider and
Geyer, 2001). Somewhat relatedly, we have seen
increased information flow from the parahippocam-
pus to the visual cortex during LSD-enhanced music
listening (Kaelen et al., 2016), a phenomenon that
can be linked to the hypothesized sensitization of
cortex to bottom-up signaling under psychedelics, in
this case stemming from a lower-level intrinsic system,
i.e., the limbic system. It is noteworthy that the limbic
system has been particularly implicated in the
action of psychedelics (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014;
Tagliazucchi et al., 2014; Lebedev et al., 2015).
An interesting study that directly addressed differ-
ential levels of perceptual processing under psilocybin
found impairments in high- but not low-level motion
perception (Carter et al., 2004). This finding makes
sense given that prestimulus a oscillations have been
found to assist high-level motion perception (Mayer
et al., 2016) and a is known to be tonically reduced
under psychedelics (Carhart-Harris et al., 2016c). The
foregoing findings (Carter et al., 2004) could be inter-
preted as consistent with the notion that low-level
autonomic functioning, which relies less on the invoca-
tion of complex internal models, is largely preserved
under psychedelics, e.g., motor action is largely pre-
served, presumably because there is relatively low
5-HT2AR expression in motor cortex (Beliveau et al.,
2017). Moreover, this may explain why low-level pro-
cessing and indeed low-level learning (including extinc-
tion learning) appear to be not just preserved but
enhanced with increased 5-HT2AR stimulation (King
et al., 1972; Welsh et al., 1998; Harvey, 2003; Harvey
et al., 2004; Romano et al., 2006, 2010; Gresch et al.,
2007; Zhang et al., 2013), whereas conventional higher-
level cognition is unsurprisingly impaired (Bayne and
Carter, 2018).
Additional evidence for reduced top-down processing
under psychedelics can be seen in changes in spontaneous
brain activity, including the aforementioned reductions
in the integrity of large-scale intrinsic networks (Carhart-
Harris et al., 2016c), as well as the relative collapse of
prominent oscillatory rhythms in the brain (Carhart-
Harris et al., 2016c) that have been linked to these high-
level networks (Laufs et al., 2003; Mantini et al., 2007).
Additionally, decreased top-down information flow has
been found when transfer entropy was applied to EEG
data recorded under ayahuasca (Alonso et al., 2015) and
when dynamic causal modeling was applied to resting-
state functional magnetic resonance imaging data,
suggesting reduced top-down flow from the posterior
cingulate cortex to the thalamus (Preller et al., 2019).
The potentially related finding of increased thalamic–
cortical information flow in this study (Preller et al., 2019)
also ties in with others (Muller et al., 2017) that have
proposed (Geyer and Vollenweider, 2008) and demon-
strated (Halberstadt and Geyer, 2018) reduced sensory
gating with psychedelics. Increased flow of sensory in-
formation up the brain’s functional hierarchy is consistent
with the general hypothesis proposed in this work that
relaxed high-level priors (REBUS) occur in parallel with
increased bottom-up signaling (anarchic brain)—as the
two model components are mutually dependent. Indeed,
this intimate relationship between priors and prediction
error is an integral part of the hierarchical prediction-
processing model.
Psychedelics have, of course, also been found to affect
higher level aspects of information processing, such as
emotional (Kaelen et al., 2015) and social processing
(Preller et al., 2016), mental time travel (Speth et al.,
2016), imagination (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012b), and
ego functioning in general (Nour et al., 2016; Milliere,
2017). We propose that the action of psychedelics on the
precision weighting of high-level priors is (one-half of)
their definitive psychological action (the other half
being increased bottom-up signaling, hence the anar-
chic brain component). With sufficiently high doses,
time and self are reported to losemeaning (Turton et al.,
2014); emotions show greater lability (Carhart-Harris
et al., 2016b), but can also be felt with greater depth
and meaning (Preller et al., 2017); and a paradoxical
intermixing of mood states can occur (Carhart-Harris
et al., 2016b). Emotional responsiveness to conventional
experimental stimuli, such as series of static facial
expressions, appears to be reduced (Kraehenmann
et al., 2015a), accompanied by reduced top-down con-
nectivity (Kraehenmann et al., 2015b). However, this
may relate to a generalized disengagement with con-
ventional behavioral paradigms, which is a particular
problem in psychedelic research. See Carhart-Harris
(2018a) for a discussion of this matter.
As noted above and consistent with a relaxation of
high-level priors, social processing appears to be af-
fected under psychedelics. For example, reduced feel-
ings of social exclusion were reported (under psilocybin)
in a behavioral paradigm designed to induce relevant
feelings of exclusion (Preller et al., 2016), and increased
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emotional empathy was seen in a separate paradigm
(Pokorny et al., 2017). Reduced rejection of unfair
monetary offers has been observed under psilocybin
and 3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine (MDMA),
whereas an additional increase in generosity was
seen with MDMA (Gabay et al., 2018). The authors
interpret these results as consistent with a prosocial
effect, something that appears to be especially char-
acteristic of the MDMA experience (Bedi et al., 2014).
MDMA is not a classic psychedelic, but, like psilocy-
bin (Kometer et al., 2012), its positive mood effects
have been linked to increased 5-HT2AR activity (van
Wel et al., 2012). Although this may be so, it is
essential to emphasize that MDMA is not a direct
5-HT2AR agonist; rather, MDMA is likely to engage
all serotonin receptors indirectly through its potent
release of serotonin (Bradbury et al., 2014). We
speculate that MDMA’s prosocial effects, including
its positive effects on social approach (Kamilar-Britt
and Bedi, 2015), may relate (at least in part) to raised
activity at 5-HT2ARs (via increased endogenous
serotonin release), causing a relaxation of socially
relevant assumptions (beliefs) that ordinarily inhibit
social approach. This effect, combined with a reduc-
tion of anxiety via serotonin’s action at its other
receptors (e.g., postsynaptic serotonin 1A receptors
in limbic circuitry) and an increase in arousal and
confidence via its release of noradrenaline and dopa-
mine, is likely to account for the characteristic sub-
jective effects of MDMA; see Carhart-Harris and Nutt
(2017) for a related discussion.
E. Comparisons with Other Altered States and Traits
1. Psychosis. It is natural to ask how the hypoth-
esized changes in brain and mind function un-
der classic psychedelics relate to other, perhaps
scientifically and medically more familiar, and thus
tangible, states and traits. The psychedelic state has
traditionally been compared with psychosis, but this
comparison needs to be carefully qualified (Carhart-
Harris et al., 2016b). It is well known that there
is considerable heterogeneity to psychosis. For exam-
ple, within the same individual, periods of (near)
remission can bookend acute psychotic episodes fea-
turing florid symptomatology. Moreover, whereas one
person may experience florid positive symptoms
associated with his/her first psychotic episode, an-
other may present with a complex, but stable de-
lusional framework coexistent with predominantly
negative symptoms.
It has previously been suggested and demon-
strated (Gouzoulis et al., 1994; Carhart-Harris et al.,
2016b) that the acute psychedelic experience is amuch
better model of the early (and perhaps acute) symp-
toms of an incipient psychosis than symptoms associ-
ated with chronic schizophrenia, presumably because
the underlying brain states of early psychosis (but not
developed) schizophrenia share similarities with
those underlying the psychedelic state. We speculate
that reduced precision weighting on high-level priors
may underlie these commonalities. This speculation
could explain common phenomenological features of
early psychosis and the psychedelic state, such as a
fragmented sense of self and a basal anxious uncer-
tainty that, if sufficiently persistent and intolerable,
may be brought under control through the formation of
an overarching delusional belief system. See Carhart-
Harris and Nutt (2017) for a relevant discussion. This
schema of weak high-level priors concomitant with
heavily weighted (i.e., precise) prediction errors, man-
ifesting as aberrant salience (Kapur, 2003) in the early
phase of a psychosis, followed by the formation of
heavily weighted and therefore stabilizing, but de-
lusional high-level priors, has been discussed before
(Clark, 2016).
We posit that the key difference between the psy-
chedelic state and schizophrenia is that a delu-
sional belief system does not (typically) crystallize in
the psychedelic state for the following reasons: 1)
unlike in psychosis, in the psychedelic state, the
system (typically) begins from a baseline state of stable
high-level priors (e.g., a stable ego) to which it returns
as drug effects subside; 2) drug effects typically subside
(e.g., after about 3–5 hours in the case of psilocybin);
thus, there is insufficient opportunity or need for
a delusional belief system to close out uncertainty;
3) increased prediction error (and accompanying
increased uncertainty) in the psychedelic state is
typically seen as an acceptable, expected, and even
valued part of the drug experience (see section
II.F.Psychedelics and Insight on insight below) and
thus is typically learned from, i.e., integrated rather
defended against, possibly via the formation of de-
lusional beliefs and flight from reality (as in schizo-
phrenia); and 4) there is no evidence that prediction
errors are overweighted in the psychedelic state; i.e.,
aberrant salient is not the rule.
Using Pavlovian conditioning, an impressive recent
study entrained the acquisition of stimulus-driven
auditory hallucinations in a range of participant
groups (Powers et al., 2017). This effect was linked
to endogenously occurring hallucinations in patho-
logic conditions such as schizophrenia. This so-called
strong priors model of hallucinations and delusions is
relatively appealing (Sterzer et al., 2018). Somemight
be tempted to extrapolate from the above study’s
findings to either perceptual abnormalities in the
psychedelic state or indeed early psychosis. However,
our position is that early psychosis and the psyche-
delic stare do not fit the strong priors model well for
the reasons discussed above.
In brief, our view of the etiology of schizophrenia
is that, for whatever combination of developmental,
environmental, and/or genetic reasons, within certain
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at-risk individuals, the brain’s highest-level priors
are ineffective, meaning bottom-up prediction errors
travel more freely up the hierarchy, affecting it as
it does.17 This much is consistent with the psychedelic
experience. However, in a developing psychosis, we
assume that the cycle of weak priors, high prediction
error is more sustained than in the psychedelic
experience. This, combined with adverse contextual
conditions (Zammit et al., 2010), may contribute to
ascending signals being ascribed greater precision in
an emergent psychosis, e.g., due to the recruitment of
dopaminergic mechanisms (Pehek et al., 2006; Pehek
and Hernan, 2015), manifesting in the classic phe-
nomenon of aberrant salience (Kapur, 2003). These
critical secondary factors that are not by default part
of the psychedelic picture most likely serve to encour-
age (delusional) interpretation of the (amped-up)
prediction errors in an effort to reduce free energy
and thus subdue and stabilize the system.
2. Hallucinogen-Persisting Perceptual Disorder.
Hallucinogen-persisting perceptual disorder (HPPD)
is a Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, 5th Edition–listed disorder that relates
to enduring visual perceptual abnormalities that
persist beyond an acute psychedelic drug experience.
Its prevalence appears to be low and its etiology
complex, but symptoms can still be distressing for
individuals (Halpern et al., 2018). Under the REBUS
model, it is natural to speculate that HPPDmay occur
if/when the collapse of hierarchical message pass-
ing does not fully recover. A compromised hierarchy
would imply a compromised suppression of prediction
error, and it is natural to assume that persistent
perceptual abnormalities reflect attempts to explain
away irreducible prediction errors. Future brain-
imaging work could examine whether aspects of
hierarchical message passing, such as top-down ef-
fective connectivity, are indeed compromised in indi-
viduals reporting HPPD.
3. Autism. Autism is another disorder in which
aberrant high-level priors have been thought to play
a role (Van de Cruys et al., 2014; van Schalkwyk et al.,
2017). On first glance, the (hypothesized) mechanics of
autism may appear to share similarities with those
proposed in this work to underlie the psychedelic state,
i.e., aberrant precision weighting on high-level priors
(e.g., relevant to social processing). Added to this, in
autism, there appears to be a compensatory upregula-
tion of attention to and thus precision weighting of
lower-level priors and sensory input. Consistently, in
autism, imprecise and/or rigid high-level priors have
been linked to deficient self-reflectiveness and theory
of mind, as well as a biasing of attention toward the
more elemental and domain-specific features of the
sensorium (Van de Cruys et al., 2014). Relatedly, a
reduction in perceptual grouping has been observed in
autism (Goris et al., 2018), as it has in the psychedelic
state (Kometer et al., 2011). It is easy to intuit some
important differences in the mechanics of autism and
the psychedelic state, however, not least because the
phenomenology appears so different. For example,
people show increased interest in others under psy-
chedelics and an enhanced awareness of emotion, self-
schemas, and interpersonal relationships (Preller
et al., 2016; Pokorny et al., 2017; Watts et al., 2017;
Pollan, 2018)—functions that are often deficient in
people with autism.
A further important difference between the psyche-
delic state and autism is that autism, like chronic
schizophrenia, presents more as a trait than state-
like phenomenon. In autism, the predictive cod-
ing architecture is skewed toward lower levels of
the hierarchy, and critically, becomes set or fixed
this way. It is hypothesized that lower levels of the
functional hierarchy are ascribed greater precision in
autism, which is often cast as a failure to attenuate
sensory precision. This is thought to occur alongside a
deficient weighting of high levels of the hierarchy,
e.g., cognition linked to complex emotion and social
awareness (Van de Cruys et al., 2014; van Schalkwyk
et al., 2017). The psychedelic state, in contrast, is,
by definition, not a trait phenomenon. Moreover,
it is also richly emotional and empathic (Watts
et al., 2017).
The psychedelic brain is likely to feature (at least in
cases where the individual is healthy) a normally
developed architecture that is transiently leveled,
meaning that the brain’s functional hierarchy tempo-
rarily flattens. Once the psychedelic itself has been
sufficiently metabolized, this temporary flattening
reverts back to its original state. In brief, the hierar-
chical abnormalities in the psychedelic state are
hypothesized to be transient, whereas those in autism
appear to be relatively intransigent and biased to the
lower (i.e., sensory) hierarchical levels.
4. Other Disorders. Consistent explanations can
be given for apparent phenomenological differ-
ences between other disorders such as Cotard de-
lusion (Dieguez, 2018) and visual agnosia (Biran and
Coslett, 2003), and the psychedelic state. Such disor-
ders may, on first glance, appear to share some useful
similarities with the psychedelic state, e.g., abnormal
self-perception in Cotard delusion and an inability to
group perceptual features in visual agnosia, yet they
differ from the psychedelic state in the relative
fixedness (Cotard delusion) and domain specificity of
the relevant abnormalities.
17Note an important nuance here: hypersensitivity to stimulation
extrinsic to the system (i.e., via sensory stimulation) may only be the
rule within a critical dose range, above which brain function is likely
to be dominated by its intrinsic activity—and so become insensitive
to extrinsic information (Michaiel et al., 2019), but still sensitive to
bottom-up information flow from within the system itself, e.g., via the
limbic system to the cortex.
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5. Meditative States. Meditative states are a special
corpus of states that, traditionally, have been compared
with the psychedelic state (Badiner and Gray, 2002).
Psychological and neurobiological similarities and differ-
ences between different meditative states and the psy-
chedelic state have recently been the focus of an extensive
review paper (Milliere et al., 2018). One major psycholog-
ical commonality is the relaxation of self-consciousness
(Batchelor, 1998). The cessation of ego consciousness or
attaining a state of “no self” is a core ideal of Buddhist
philosophy and quality of effective meditation (Batchelor,
1998; Hanh, 2017). Importantly, the emergence of insight
on cessation of ego-centered consciousness is another
important component of Buddhist philosophy and prac-
tice, e.g., in Vipassana (i.e., Pali for insight meditation)
(Batchelor, 1998). As we address in the forthcoming
section, insight is also a core component of the psychedelic
experience (Watts et al., 2017; Noorani et al., 2018).
In brief, key neurobiological similarities between
meditative and psychedelic states that have been
detected with brain imaging include the following:
relative deactivation of the DMN (Carhart-Harris
et al., 2012a; Garrison et al., 2013), reduced
anticorrelation between the DMN and networks con-
cerned with processing the extrinsic world (Carhart-
Harris et al., 2013; Josipovic, 2014), and, recently, the
enhancement of signatures of criticality (Atasoy et al.,
2017). Important differences, such as the absence of
decreased a power (Lomas et al., 2015) with meditation,
may depend on the conventional use of relaxation
techniques to enter a meditative state, although see
Kakumanu et al. (2018) for evidence of increased brain
entropy in experienced meditators practicing Vipassana
meditation.
Psychedelics arguably induce ego dissolution much
more reliably than most individuals’ meditations, albeit
in a dose-dependent manner (Nour et al., 2016). As has
been discussed above in relation to psychosis, improving
ourmethods of capturing phenomenologically-rich states
while recording brain activity may help to reveal consis-
tencies between brain changes that have been observed
with EEG and MEG and psychedelics and those known
to occur in relevant nondrug-induced states. Such an
approach does, however, present significant pragmatic
challenges centered on the problem of the uncertainty
principle, i.e., that in the act of measuring, we affect the
phenomenon of interest, e.g., see Carhart-Harris (2018a)
for a relevant discussion.
F. Psychedelics and Insight
1. Introduction.
“This was a vision, fresh and clear as a mountain
stream; the mind revealing itself to itself.”18
In this section, we address an assumption that is central
to traditional psychedelic therapy, i.e., that psyche-
delics can facilitate psychological insight. Couched in
the language of the dominant school of the day,
psychoanalysis, clinicians conducting psychedelic ther-
apy in the 1950s and 60s adhered to a model that
maintained that these compounds work to relax the
ego and its various defenses, such that unconscious
material could emerge into consciousness. It is popu-
larly commented that Freudian-minded therapists saw
Freudian contents in their patients’ psychedelic expe-
riences, whereas Jungians saw Jungian material, as if
priming and biased perspective and interpretation
rendered the relevant theories mere tautologies. This
view may be too absolutist, however, as these deep
psychological models may well share important simi-
larities with each other and be much more complemen-
tary than contrasting. The same content may indeed be
interpreted differently depending on the influence of
different theoretical frameworks, but this does not
preclude the possibility that the genuine release of
unconscious, or, at least, incompletely conscious psy-
chological material takes place via the antihierarchical
action of psychedelics.
Previous work has sought to examine the notion that
psychedelics facilitate the emergence of unconscious
material into consciousness (in the classic psychoana-
lytic sense) using a primarily qualitative approach,
supplemented by neurobiological data (Carhart-
Harris, 2007). One must be wary of the fallacy of
inverse inference, however, as neither isolated phe-
nomenology nor neurobiology alone renders first-
person experience real in the veridical sense. Thus,
an improved methodology is required if this impor-
tant principle of psychedelic therapy is to be better
tested.
Fortunately, such developments are presently un-
derway. Perhaps the most appealing is to measure
insight by its behavioral consequences—an ironically
Skinnerian approach—that is meritorious for its
pragmatism. For example, acute experiences of self-
reported insight were found to predict subsequent
long-term clinical improvements (Carhart-Harris
et al., 2018a) and changes in personality (Erritzoe
et al., 2018) in individuals treated with psilocybin for
treatment-resistant depression. Moreover, the same
individuals became more accurate at predicting fu-
ture life events after this treatment, meaning they
were less delusionally pessimistic and thus more
clear-sighted (Lyons and Carhart-Harris, 2018b).
Separately, in a double-blind study with an active
comparator (dextromethorphan), greater psychologi-
cal insight was reported with psilocybin than the
control compound (Carbonaro et al., 2018).
As with the replication of evidence, its convergence
on a particular interpretation is another key indicator
of its reliability and robustness—a process related to18https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kjeCNnbVYAQ.
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triangulation. Previous work has sought to demon-
strate how numerous altered states, including
dreaming (Carhart-Harris, 2007), exhibit a related
phenomenology to the psychedelic state, including,
of course, reports of the emergence of unconscious
material into consciousness—alongside a related neu-
robiology (Carhart-Harris, 2007). However, we recog-
nize that a stricter test of this principle will require the
issuing of more structured assessments of insight and
its consequences. The issuing of improved measures
of insight has recently been addressed successfully in
relation to dreaming (Edwards et al., 2013) and is now
being implemented in our own psychedelic research.
2. The Mechanics of Insight. What are the mechan-
ics of insight? This matter has recently been
approached from the perspective of the free-energy
principle, both conceptually and computationally
(Friston et al., 2017). Key concepts to invoke in this
work include the following: 1) curious behavior, explor-
ative search, novelty seeking, and epistemic learning,
plus 2) structure and fact-free learning, abductive
reasoning, Bayesian model selection (BMS),19 BMR,20
and “aha” or “eureka” moments. We will now unpack
these various concepts and explain how they speak to
the psychedelic experience.
It is widely recognized in literature on creativity
that insight often occurs as part of a process, the
initial phase of which involves an intention or plan,
e.g., to discover something new. One heuristic for
doing this is to relax one’s confidence in one’s prior
assumptions (i.e., high-level priors), and, in so doing,
promote an open, inquiring state of mind. This
approach is essentially epistemic in nature, i.e.,
it is a behavioral strategy intended for learning,
under the assumption that there is something to be
learnt, i.e., there is some expected uncertainty
(Friston et al., 2017).21 More than this, however, the
knowledge seeker hopes to learn in an optimal way,
e.g., learning as much as possible, with the least
amount of effort. He/She does this by sampling areas
where this is an opportunity to resolve a lot of
uncertainty, i.e., where there is a lot to be learnt
(Friston et al., 2017).
This is the essence of curious behavior (Friston et al.,
2017) and is consistent with an explorative search
strategy, which entails exploring novelty for the sake
of significant knowledge gain (also known as intrinsic
motivation in robotics) (Oudeyer and Kaplan, 2007;
Schmidhuber, 2010; Barto et al., 2013). It is a strategy
that dominates early in life and reduces later on, as
exploitative searching becomes more relevant. Exploit-
ative searching supersedes explorative search when the
agent feels confident enough that some basic parame-
ters have been established (Gopnik et al., 2017).
These heuristics for promoting insight resonate
with those used by practitioners working therapeuti-
cally with psychedelics; e.g., a popular mantra told
to patients ahead of recent trials with psilocybin is
as follows: “trust, let go, be open” (Richards, 2015).
Moreover, it has long been assumed, and also re-
cently demonstrated, that approaching a psychedelic
session with a clear therapeutic intention is condu-
cive to subsequent positive mental health outcomes
(Haijen et al., 2018). Perhaps relatedly, higher scores
for trait absorption and lower scores for stubbornness
have been found to predict consistent positive out-
comes (Haijen et al., 2018). It is natural to intuit that
these findings point to a common early-phase compo-
nent of insight, in which the relaxation of prior
assumptions (high-level priors), whether done will-
fully or with the assistance of a psychedelic, height-
ens an individual’s openness and receptivity to new
perspectives.
The suggestion that the relaxation of (high-level)
assumptions is conducive to insight is telling, as
it implies that insight-related processes operate
implicitly, i.e., without conscious awareness, and
can be made more effective if executive function
is suspended. It is worth noting that partici-
pants typically lie still with eyes closed during
psychedelic treatment sessions and are advised to
surrender their usual analytic thinking, in favor of a
relaxed, freely-wandering mindset. This is consis-
tent with itinerant processes characteristic of ordi-
nary mind wandering—as well as dreaming—that
are likely catalyzed further by psychedelics. Thus,
rather than eagerly seeking out new data to resolve
uncertainty, the agent is advised to forgo conven-
tional epistemic foraging and instead allow process-
es to play out naturally and unconsciously, e.g., by
sleeping on it (Friston et al., 2017) or doing some-
thing else.
The concept of structure learning (Tervo et al.,
2016; Friston et al., 2017) is relevant to the phenom-
enon of insight. This refers to the identification
of high-level structure or patterns in large, com-
plex data sets, i.e., it emphasizes “seeing the woods”
or the “bigger picture,” over getting “lost in the trees”
or the details. An improved ability to see the “bigger
picture” is logically implied by the energy landscape
flattening effect of psychedelics discussed earlier. The
notion of fact-free learning (Aragones et al., 2004;
19BMS is a mechanism by which a best-performing model is
identified from a set of models. Model performance is determined by a
trade-off between model fit (specificity) and model complexity. Good
models are those that fit data well enough, i.e., they do not overfit the
data through the inclusion of too many parameters.
20Bayesian model reduction is a mechanism through which model
parameters are pruned to reduce model complexity. It is a
mechanism of model optimization done in aid of model selection.
21Expected uncertainty is a mindset that is encouraged ahead of
psychedelic therapy and speaks to an important difference between
the psychedelic experience and psychosis, i.e., where uncertainty is
not expected and so prediction error is not accepted or integrated.
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Friston et al., 2017) is also relevant. This refers
to learning without necessarily accumulating new
information or facts, i.e., because a fresh perspec-
tive or frame of reference, rather than more new
data per se, may be more valuable for advancing
understanding.
These concepts of structure and fact-free learning
hint at something fundamental about the phenomenon
of insight. Returning to the free-energy principle, we
know that an agent can minimize free energy via
perceptual (Friston and Kiebel, 2009) and active
inference (Friston et al., 2012b), both of which entail
sampling and sculpting the world to refine internal
representations of it and thus reduce uncertainty or
enhance confidence. There is, however, another higher
level at which free energy may be minimized, namely
via the selection and/or revision of beliefs about the
acquired models themselves. This is known as BMS
and BMR.
BMR is a particularly intriguing form of BMS that
is likely to play a central role in brain development,
e.g., in the form of synaptic pruning (Piochon et al.,
2016) and formation of small-world architectures
(Avena-Koenigsberger et al., 2014). In brief, BMR is
the hypothesized mechanism via which high-level
models are stripped of their redundancy so that
simpler, more refined solutions may be revealed.
Again, we see the theme of complexity minimization
and compression in play. In this setting, one can
refine high-level models or narratives to make them
simpler by removing redundant parameters, thereby
revealing the underlying core structures and mani-
folds. Crucially, this mechanism can proceed without
the need for new data (fact-free learning) and is
thought by some to be the purpose of sleep and
accompanying synaptic homoeostasis (Hobson et al.,
2014).
Importantly, optimal models must strike a balance
between the following: 1) breadth or comprehension
and 2) accuracy or precision. Broad (minimally
complex) models can serve as catch-all representa-
tions that generalize across different scenarios.
Meritorious for their generalizability, they may,
however, suffer from oversimplicity, e.g., with too
few parameters to say anything specific about a
given phenomenon. Accurate models are naturally
meritorious for their fidelity to a given phenomenon
but can fall foul of overmodeling, in which an over-
parameterized model poorly translates from one
phenomenon to another. It has been hypothesized
that implicit processes of BMS and BMR underlie the
experience of insight, with a particular emphasis on
the latter. This is because the relevant “aha” or
“eureka” experiences typically emerge spontane-
ously, “out of the blue,” as simple, elegant solutions,
presumably because redundant models and/or model
parameters have been unconsciously stripped away,
leaving the “bare truth beneath.”22 Computational
simulations have recently leant support to this
conception of insight (Friston et al., 2017).
It is natural to speculate that BMS and BMR may
underlie the occurrence of insight under psychedelics,
and that psychedelics catalyze these processes of model
refinement. Psychedelics have been shown to increase
the entropy or complexity of spontaneous brain activity
(Carhart-Harris, 2018a), which, on first glance, may be
seen as inconsistent with BMS and BMR. Rather, we
suggest that the acute psychedelic “hot state” reflects
the preconditions for subsequent insight; i.e., it reflects
a key phase of the process by which insight occurs in
which confidence in high-level models is first relin-
quished so that content previously hidden from con-
sciousness by the occluding influence of overly confident
priors is now allowed to emerge, thereby enabling fresh
perspectives to be entertained. Under conditions of
relaxed high-level priors, disinhibited information is
allowed to travel up the hierarchy and impress on
consciousness as it does. In this way, one may be
granted a fresh opportunity to cultivate changes to the
relevant assumptions instantiated by high hierarchical
levels.
Relatedly, in the acute hot state, the mind can explore
its unfurled state space with fewer constraints,
consistent with curious behavior (e.g., as in Fig. 1).
In this way, the conscious explorer may discover
novelty that was previously hidden from clear sight.
Relatedly, he/she may report being able to see things
from afar as per the overview effect originally de-
scribed by astronauts (White, 1987). The overview
effect is, of course, consistent with BMR and the
pruning away of detail to see the bigger picture.
Realizations of this sort are often felt as beautiful
and transcendent in their simplicity and profundity
but have also been queried as platitudinal:
“Love is everything… Is a platitude so deeply
felt still just a platitude? No, I decided. A platitude is
precisely what is left of a truth after it has been drained
of all emotion. To resaturate that dried husk with
feeling is to see it again for what it is: the loveliest and
most deeply rooted of truths, hidden in plain sight. A
spiritual insight? Maybe so” (Pollan, 2018).
22Addressing the question of whether the unconscious in the
classical psychoanalytic sense (regardless of specific schools) influ-
ences conscious cognition and behavior, we can answer that it is our
assumption that the unconscious does indeed influence behavior.
This assumption is consistent with the position of classical
psychoanalytic thinkers such as Freud and Jung. Personal testimo-
nies speak to this assumption when individuals report insights about
how past events have led to current behaviors without their conscious
awareness. It is clearly important to consider how this assumption
might be tested, so that stronger inferences can be drawn. One might
construe implicit processing as a cognitive psychology homologue of
this psychoanalytic idea, and implicit association paradigms could be
used to probe it behaviorally.
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The following are further firsthand references to
experiences of insight experienced under psychedelics,
plus another, for the sake of comparison, from an
Apollo-mission astronaut. It is easy to appreciate their
resonance with the mechanics described in this sec-
tion, in particular the experience of being able to see a
bigger picture:
“I was being reminded of things I already knew”
(Watts et al., 2017); “I was learning without being
taught” (Watts et al., 2017); “There had been, I felt, an
opening of the heart” (Pollan, 2018); “Patrick de-
scribed an epiphany having to do with simplicity:
‘…I was convinced in that moment I had figured it all
out… It was right there in front of me… love… the
only thing that mattered’” (Pollan, 2018); “Like google
earth; I had zoomed out” (Watts et al., 2017); “In
my cockpit window, every two minutes: the earth,
the moon, the sun, and whole panorama of the
heavens… And suddenly I realised that the molecules
of my body, the spacecraft, the body of my partners,
were all manufactured in some ancient genera-
tion of stars. I felt an overwhelming sense of one-
ness, or connectedness…– an insight, an epiphany”
(Pollan, 2018).
3. Criticality and Optimality. Criticality is a phe-
nomenon described and studied within dynamical sys-
tems theory and complexity science that refers to
complex dynamics that occur when a system nears a
transition point between order and disorder. A
self-organized critical system can exhibit complex
emergent phenomena such as self-similarity, ava-
lanching, long-range correlations, and critical slow-
ing (Chialvo, 2010). The notion of a critical brain
posits that neuronal activity is poised at criticality
(Chialvo, 2004), and the entropic brain hypothesis
states that psychedelics bring the brain closer still to
such a critical point, as reflected by stronger signa-
tures of criticality in the psychedelic state (Carhart-
Harris et al., 2014; Carhart-Harris, 2018a). These
latter findings imply that normal brain function (at
least in awake adults) can be tuned closer to critical-
ity, meaning that, with respect to the psychedelic
state, normal waking consciousness biases order over
disorder, or preservation over adaptation (Carhart-
Harris et al., 2014; Carhart-Harris, 2018a)—at least
in relation to the psychedelic state and even though
it may still exhibit properties of criticality itself
(Hilgetag and Hutt, 2014). The hypotheses that the
waking brain can be tuned closer to criticality and that
psychedelics do indeed do this have both recently been
leant significant empirical support (Atasoy et al., 2017;
Tagliazucchi, 2017; Muthukumaraswamy and Liley,
2018; Varley et al., 2019).
What is the relationship between criticality andmodel
optimality? Are inequalities or asymmetries in the adult
human brain’s functional architecture, such as high
a power and high degree centrality of and metabolism
in DMN nodes,23 indicative of a top-heavy system
that biases high-level models (such as the ego and its
various beliefs and defenses) over data? Does this top
heaviness render the adult human mind somewhat
impervious to the fullness of information contained
within lower levels of the system, such as the classi-
cally mammalian system (MacLean, 1990) that is
the limbic system? Is this top heaviness especially
exaggerated in certain psychopathologies such as de-
pression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and eating
disorders? These are examples of disorders that may
rest on particularly rigid high-level priors that dom-
inate cognition and likely serve a defensive function
(Carhart-Harris, 2019).
These are important questions, and it is not diffi-
cult to imagine how they could be tested.24 Little work
has been done on enduring brain changes after a
psychedelic experience, but what evidence there is
does suggest potential thinning in the posterior
cingulate cortex node of the DMN with repeated
ayahuasca use (Bouso et al., 2015) and also changes
in DMN functional connectivity 1 day after psilocybin
therapy for depression (Carhart-Harris et al., 2017).
If BMR does play a role in insight under or after a
psychedelic experience, we might predict a flatten-
ing of the relevant free-energy (attractor) landscape
postacutely, e.g., this might present as an attenu-
ated vestige of the more dramatic flattening likely to
characterize the acute psychedelic state (Atasoy et al.,
2018); e.g., see Fig. 1. Future work may focus on the
DMN, with the prediction that its usual dominance
is subdued post-treatment, e.g., with characteristic
changes in time-series complexity and criticality that
can be quantified empirically. If there is an enduring
nature to the relaxation of high-level compressive
models, we might also seek to test the notion that
the brain is more sensitive to simple sensory pre-
diction error post-treatment with a psychedelic.
Such a finding would be consistent with a scenario
in which a postacute relaxation of priors allows for
an enhanced sensitivity to “data.” Recent findings of
increased amygdala responsivness to emotional faces
post-treatment with psilocybin, for example, could be
seen as consistent with such a scenario (Roseman
et al., 2018a). Other more classic prediction–error
23Marcus Raichle: “Chaos is averted because all systems are not
created equal… At the top of hierarchy resides the DMN” —cited in
Ref. 20.
24First one needs to provide a concrete definition of top heaviness
and then test, e.g., that this is greater in relevant psychopathologies
versus health and also that effective treatment with a psychedelic
reduces them. One candidate for top-down influence might be DMN
to limbic effective connectivity; another is a power; and yet another is
to equate top heaviness with subcriticality, and thus state that
stronger signatures of criticality reflect a less top-heavy system.
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paradigms might also reveal an enhanced neuronal
surprise signal post-treatment with psilocybin, con-
sistent with a vestigial lightening of top-down con-
straints and concomitant sensitivity to bottom-up
information flow.
4. Therapeutic and Epistemic Transformation.
There is growing interest in the potential of psychedelics
to treat various psychiatric disorders (Carhart-Harris
and Goodwin, 2017; Rucker et al., 2018). Evidence from
a series of recent small-scale studies (Moreno et al.,
2006; Grob et al., 2011; Gasser et al., 2014; Bogenschutz
et al., 2015; Osório Fde et al., 2015; Carhart-Harris
et al., 2016a, 2018a; Griffiths et al., 2016; Ross et al.,
2016; Palhano-Fontes et al., 2019), in addition to popula-
tion studies (Krebs and Johansen, 2013; Hendricks et al.,
2015), controlled studies in healthy individuals (Griffiths
et al., 2006; Schmid and Liechti, 2018), conceptual and
empirical mechanistic work (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012a,
2014, 2017, 2018c; Carhart-Harris and Nutt, 2017; Rose-
man et al., 2018), naturalistic and observational studies
(Thomas et al., 2013; Argento et al., 2017; Lafrance et al.,
2017; Haijen et al., 2018), and meta-analyses of historic
trials from the mid-20th century (Krebs and Johansen,
2012; Rucker et al., 2016) has leant collective support to
the position that psychedelic therapy offers a promising
new treatment option for patients andmental health care
providers. The question now follows, how does it work
(Carhart-Harris, 2019)?
Previous commentaries have hypothesized (Fletcher
and Frith, 2009) and demonstrated aberrant predictive
processing in a variety of psychopathologies, from
autism (Van de Cruys et al., 2017) and schizophrenia
(Powers et al., 2017) to addiction (Gu, 2018) and
depression (Chekroud, 2015). Several factors support
the notion that there exists a common mechanistic
denominator underlying different expressions ofmental
illness. These include the following: 1) putatively high
comorbidity (Maj, 2005), 2) the poor reliability of di-
agnoses across diagnosing clinicians (Richieri et al.,
2011), and 3) absence of specific and reliable biomarkers
to bolster such diagnoses (Venkatasubramanian and
Keshavan, 2016), and the fact that the same category
of drug can be used to treat a number of different
disorders (Kramer, 1994; Whitaker, 2010). If such a
common denominator exists, however, what might
it be? Some have suggested it may be a loss of meaning
and associated sense of dislocation (Alexander, 2008)
or disconnection (Watts et al., 2017; Hari, 2018),
others have proposed a narrowing of focus (or “capture”)
in a context of a perceived loss of control (Kessler, 2016),
while still others have proposed pathologic precision
weighting of priors (Friston et al., 2014). See also
Carhart-Harris (2019).
It is reasonable to suspect that these different
models are largely inter-related, and, indeed, it is
easy to see how they can be subsumed under the free-
energy principle. In this study, we take the position
that most, if not all, expressions of mental illness
can be traced to aberrations in the normal mechanics
of hierarchical predictive coding, particularly in
the precision weighing of both high-level priors and
prediction error. We also propose that, if delivered
well (Carhart-Harris et al., 2018c), psychedelic ther-
apy can be helpful for such a broad range of disorders
precisely because psychedelics work pharmacologi-
cally (5-HT2AR agonism) and neurophysiologically
(increased excitability of deep-layer pyramidal neu-
rons) to relax the precision weighting of high-level
priors (instantiated by high-level cortex) such that
they become more sensitive to context (e.g., via
sensitivity to bottom-up information flow intrinsic to
the system) and amenable to revision (Carhart-
Harris, 2018b).
Consistent with the model presented in this work,
overweighted high-level priors can be all consuming,
exerting excessive influence throughout the mind and
brain’s (deep) hierarchy. The negative cognitive bias in
depression is a good example of this (Beck, 1972), as
are fixed delusions in psychosis (Sterzer et al., 2018).25
In this paper, we propose that psychedelics can be
therapeutically effective, precisely because they target
the high levels of the brain’s functional hierarchy,
primarily affecting the precision weighting of high-
level priors or beliefs. More specifically, we propose
that psychedelics dose-dependently relax the precision
weighting of high-level priors (instantiated by high-
level cortex), and in so doing, open them up to an
upsurge of previously suppressed bottom-up signaling
(e.g., stemming from limbic circuitry). We further
propose that this sensitization of high-level priors
means that more information can impress on them,
potentially inspiring shifts in perspective, felt as in-
sight. One might ask whether relaxation followed by
revision of high-level priors or beliefs via psychedelic
therapy is easy to see with functional (and anatomic)
brain imaging. We presume that it must be detectable,
if the right questions are asked in the right way.
It seems reasonable to suppose that the relevant
transformations reported under and after a psyche-
delic experience (Griffiths et al., 2006; Watts et al.,
2017) are principally epistemic in nature, i.e., mani-
festing as revisions in awareness or perspective, but it
stands to reason that they must still register on some
level as a change in brain function. It may be difficult,
but not impossible, to identify the relevant neuronal
changes, and doing so will be a particular challenge
for psychedelic science. One difficulty may relate to
the level of analysis. For example, the apparently
fundamental nature of the long-term psychological
changes seen with psychedelics (e.g., in personality
25To be clear, for reasons stated earlier, we are not, at this stage,
proposing psychedelic therapy as a treatment of psychotic disorders.
Such a proposition would require much careful thought and
qualification—and even still, may not pass as feasible/indicated.
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and outlook) suggests that something particularly
high level or large scale may also have transpired in
the brain.26 One thought is that we may need to look
at trajectories of brain states rather than individual
brain states per se, to see in high-level beliefs in
action (Cabral et al., 2017), how they change after
psychedelics (Lord et al., 2018), and how this relates to
the relevant psychological change(s).
5. Are Psychedelic-Induced Insights Trustworthy?
Before closing this section, we wish to address a
difficult question that is often raised in relation to
psychedelic therapy and specifically the principle
that psychedelics work to facilitate insight. This is
the question of whether the reported insight is
veridical—in the sense of reflecting things that are
actually true or real. For example, it is not uncom-
mon for patients to report apparent recovery of re-
pressed memories under psychedelics (Sandison,
1954; Carhart-Harris, 2007), and indeed, we had one
such case in our recent psilocybin for treatment-
resistant depression trial (Carhart-Harris et al.,
2018a).
Without wishing to fall down a philosophical rabbit
hole, the most pragmatic position may be to accept
such experiences as psychologically real in the sense
that they are inferences that serve to close an
explanatory gap, and do so relatively effectively. In
this sense, magical, religious, and delusional beliefs
or interpretations may be considered psychologically
real. That magical beliefs are common in situations of
uncertainty (Bersabe and Arias, 2000) speaks to the
principle that belief in magic can serve a psycholog-
ical function. This sympathy with gap-filling, jumping
to conclusions, or abductive reasoning (Friston et al.,
2017) is also a principle that governs care in the
context of patients with psychosis, for example, where
clinicians refrain from attempting to correct delu-
sional beliefs because of an acknowledgment that
doing so may be destabilizing for the patient.
This problem has recently been addressed in a
thoughtful philosophical piece, entitled “the episte-
mic innocence of psychedelic states” (Letheby, 2016),
which essentially takes a stance that is consistent
with the one described above, i.e., that (apparent)
insight be viewed with equanimity if it appears to
mediate positive therapeutic outcomes, even if the
apparent insight is founded on dubious (e.g., super-
natural) assumptions. Technically, the philosophical
rabbit hole dissolves further in the face of the free-
energy principle. This follows because the free-energy
principle maintains that there is no absolute truth
that is knowable absolutely—there is only evidence
for a set of plausible hypotheses. In other words, the
best beliefs or models are simply those with the
greatest evidence—or minimum free energy.
In essence, the free-energy principle works to approx-
imate reality through invoking, testing, revising, and
optimizing models. Effective approximations of reality
are reliable and trustworthy, whereas less optimal
models are flimsy and fragile, e.g., they may be overly
complex and/or poorly translatable. If such models fail,
this will expose their fallibility to the agent, together
with a likely unpleasant rise in his/her sense of un-
certainty. Thus, a commitment to the discovery of better
models is important, as improved models will provide
more robust and reliable approximations to reality,
which are likely to support greater stability in terms
of mental health.27 These principles may be seen to
speak to the merits of the scientific method for de-
termining “what is best to believe.” For example,
although supernatural belief systems may have once
been helpful for humans28—they are arguably less so
today.Moreover, beliefs held as amatter of faith are less
amenable to the mechanics of self-correction that un-
derlie empirical approaches.
G. What to Do About the “woo”?29
Psychedelics have an interesting history of associa-
tion with pseudoscience and supernatural belief.
One interpretation of this is that a strong psychedelic
experience can cause such an ontological shock that
the experiencer feels compelled to reach for some kind
of explanation, however tenuous or fantastical, to close
an epistemic gap that the experience has opened up for
them. This is an important matter, particularly as
increasing numbers of people are likely to be exper-
imenting with psychedelics in the coming years—but it
is also a rich topic that deserves a separate discussion
piece of its own.
It is important, however, to address thismatter briefly
in this work, as it is a problem that speaks to the special
value of a naturalistic approach to psychedelics, as well
as a responsible one that includes provision of education
(e.g., about the importance of psychological preparation
26Note also that preclinical molecular and cellular approaches can
now detect long-term postpsychedelic changes, as might human
positron–emission tomography and high-field magnetic resonance
imaging. Although it is not always straightforward to decipher how
molecular and cellular changes translate to human psychology,
combining high-resolution measures with conventional functional
brain imaging may be a potentially fruitful strategy.
27From a statistical perspective—and machine learning—this
robustness is cast in terms of the ability to generalize to new data.
This rests on flattening short minima to reduce model complexity and
preclude overfitting.
28Note: we adopt the view that Buddhism (like science) is not a
religion but a method and (like science) performs best when treated
as such.
29“woo” or “woo-woo” is a slang term with an unknown etymology.
It is assumed to stem from its jocular and often pejorative use, when
imitating a sound effect or the music one might hear during the
depiction of supernatural events on television, in theatre, or in films.
Succinctly, “woo-woo” refers to belief in the supernatural, para-
normal, occult, and has a particular association with pseudoscience,
particularly in the West.
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and integration) alongside careful engineering of the
experience itself (Carhart-Harris et al., 2018c). If done
properly, tenuous magical explanations can then be
challenged appropriately (although not during the expe-
rience itself—as to do so would be inappropriate) in the
skeptical, self-correcting fashion that is intrinsic to the
scientific method. Reliable and robust models of natural
phenomena, of the sort that science endeavors to discover
and finesse, serve us best, as they are less likely to betray
us, leaving us open to logical fallacies, dogmatism,
absolutism, and an emotional and existential instability.
The phenomenon of spiritual bypassing is relevant in
this work. This refers to an ontology in which individ-
uals receive so much (potential) information, rapidly,
without sufficient time to properly integrate or assim-
ilate it (Masters, 2010). In experiencing such informa-
tion overload, the psychedelic initiate may reach for
bizarre beliefs or poorly understood platitudes, in an
effort to explain away his/her felt uncertainty—in a
similar way as may occur in the incipient phase of a
psychotic disorder. Spiritual bypassing may be under-
stood as an escapist defense, dressed up as a spiritual
awakening. Combining psychedelic therapy with a
secular wisdom teaching, such as can be found in
nonreligious Buddhism for example (Batchelor, 1998;
Hanh, 2017), as well as depth psychology (Freud, 1934,
1949; Jung, 1960, 1969), may have considerable value in
this regard, helping to ground psychedelic science and
medicine, while inoculating against evangelism.
H. The Anarchic Brain
The anarchic brain principle is a natural counterpart
to relaxed beliefs under psychedelics (REBUS). This is
because the relaxation of high-level priors necessarily
implies a liberation of bottom-up information flow
(particularly from intrinsic sources). Thus, because
top-down control is a defining property of hierarchy,
REBUS is commensurate with a loss of functional
hierarchy in the brain. The word “anarchy” has a
Latin–Greek origin and means “without chief” or
“ruler.” It is most typically used in political contexts
to refer to “a state of disorder due to absence or
nonrecognition of authority or other controlling sys-
tems” or “absence of government and [thus] absolute
freedom of the individual” (Oxford English Dictionary).
The anarchic brain principle is a close complement to
the entropic brain hypothesis. Both feature as part of
their definition, the principle that psychedelics enhance
brain entropy (e.g., as measured by Lempel–Ziv com-
plexity) and bottom-up information flow (e.g., measur-
able via effective connectivity). Both principles are also
intended to apply first and foremost to spontaneous
brain activity—and are difficult to assess using classic
stimulus–response paradigms—for reasons discussed
elsewhere (Carhart-Harris, 2018a).
As an extension of the anarchic brain principle, in this
final section,we speculate that the structural organization
of brains (and minds) recapitulates the organization of
social systems. Just as the free-energy principle rec-
ognizes the importance of hierarchy inside the brain, so
it recognizes it elsewhere in nature. For example, we
may think of individuals constrained by communities,
constrained by nation states, constrained by unions
of states, etc. We may also reflect on the hierarchy of
beliefs at each level, e.g., with individual beliefs con-
strained by community beliefs, constrained by national
beliefs, constrained by transnational beliefs. We do not
wish to take this analogy too far, only to raise the idea,
which, of course, is inherent in the free-energy princi-
ple, that beliefs are hierarchical, and humans are
apparently unique among the animal species because
of the temporal thickness of their beliefs, spanning
greater periods of time than do the generative models
of other species (Becker, 2011; Chouraqui, 2011; Seth
and Friston, 2016).
Grounding these ideas in biology, neuroimaging
research with psychedelics has revealed a breakdown
in modular integration under these compounds that is
superseded by a desegregated, more globally inter-
connected organization of brain function (Roseman
et al., 2014; Carhart-Harris et al., 2016c). It has also
been shown that these brain changes correlate with
peoples’ ratings of ego dissolution under the drug
(Tagliazucchi et al., 2016), which, when it is surren-
dered to (Haijen et al., 2018), includes as a logical
corollary of it, the so-called unitive experience, i.e., a
sense of union and interconnectedness with objects
and entities previously seen as external to oneself
(Hanh, 2017; Roseman et al., 2018b). We have recently
seen that a globally connected brain state is visited
more regularly under psychedelics than other brain
states, whereas certain high-level states/networks
become neglected (Lord et al., 2018). Such an outcome
can be seen as commensurate with a flattened energy
landscape.
The unitive experience is closely related to the over-
view effect described in a previous section, and it is
also the essential, defining characteristic of the
mystical (Maclean et al., 2012)—or perhaps better-
phrased peak experience (Roseman et al., 2018b).
Note that whereas the peak experience itself can be
treated as irreducible in the experiential sense, its
occurrence may still depend on reaching a critical
level of 5-HT2AR occupancy and signaling (Madsen
et al., 2019)—a useful reminder that however high
level a psychological phenomenon is, it will still rest
on discernable physical, energetic, and chemical
processes.
A number of research teams have shown that the
occurrence of peak experiences under psychedelics is
predictive of long-term positive changes in psycholog-
ical well-being [e.g., Roseman et al. (2018b)], as well
as changes in personality in the direction of increased
openness (MacLean et al., 2011; Erritzoe et al., 2018).
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It is a matter of some curiosity that the personality
trait openness has reliably been shown to correlate
with liberal political perspectives (Carney et al.,
2008), and a realization of this led to a series of
studies by us (Nour et al., 2017; Lyons and Carhart-
Harris, 2018a) and others (Forstmann and Sagioglou,
2017) that have demonstrated long-term changes in
political perspective in association with the use of
psychedelics.
It is natural to speculate from these findings that
changes in brain function that may be defining of the
psychedelic state, e.g., heightened brain entropy,
modular disintegration, increased global integration,
and increased bottom-up information flow from in-
trinsic sources (Carhart-Harris, 2018a), may be in-
volved in the mediation of (potentially) fundamental
transformations in beliefs, including changes in per-
sonality and outlook. Providing initial support for
this, we previously found a relationship between in-
creased brain entropy under LSD, as measured with
functional magnetic resonance imaging, and subse-
quent increases in trait openness (Lebedev et al.,
2016). Moreover, on a purely psychological level, we have
found that ego dissolutionmediates long-term increases in
trait liberalism and decreased authoritarianism (Nour
et al., 2017).
How these acute brain changes and associated mind
states trigger the relevant long-term changes in
beliefs is, at this stage, not fully understood—but
increased bottom-up information flow (i.e., from
lower-level intrinsic systems such as the limbic sys-
tem) impacting on sensitized high-level priors (e.g.,
high-level networks and their dynamics) are logical
places to look. The relevant transformations them-
selves are epistemic in nature, e.g., taking the form of
a revised awareness or perspective. Once discovered,
the newly appreciated awareness cannot easily be
forgotten, tantamount in some ways to the effect of
trauma. However, how do these epistemic transfor-
mations register in the brain? Are they detectable in
anatomy as well as function? Is there such a thing as a
liberal or libertarian brain (Kanai et al., 2011)? Is the
brain’s functional hierarchy organized differently in an
individual with strong libertarian and/or liberal views,
compared with someone holding strong authoritarian
and/or conservative beliefs?
Two figureheads in psychedelic research and ther-
apy, Stanislav Grof and Roland Griffiths, have high-
lighted how psychedelics have historically “loosed the
Dionysian element” (Pollan, 2018) to the discomfort of
the ruling elite, i.e., not just in 1960s America but also
centuries earlier when conquistadors suppressed the
use of psychedelic plants by indigenous people of the
same continent. FormerHarvard psychology professor,
turned psychedelic evangelist, Timothy Leary, cajoled
that LSD could stand for “Let the State Dissolve”
(Pollan, 2018). Whatever the interaction between
psychedelic use and political perspective, we hope that
psychedelic science will be given the best possible
opportunity to positively impact on psychology, psy-
chiatry, and society in the coming decades—so that it
may achieve its promise of significantly advancing self-
understanding and health care. An ill-thought–
through repoliticization of psychedelic use would likely
be counterproductive in this regard.
Whatever the sensitivities surrounding these issues,
it seems right to openly acknowledge the possibility
that increased psychedelic use could have broader
social and political implications. If rates of psyche-
delic use were to escalate, poorly integrated experi-
ences could leave individuals awash in uncertainty
and eager for solace in tenuous, or, worse, delusional
beliefs that serve to stop-gap uncertainty. We advo-
cate a commitment to the position that—however
otherworldly it may feel—the psychedelic experience
is a thing of nature, intimately linked to discernible
changes in brain function. It is possible that such a
naturalistic, scientific approach to psychedelics may
spawn greater interest in deep ecology (Naess, 1984).
Relatedly, integrating observations from psychedelic
science, with insights from physics and life sciences
(Bejan, 2016), depth psychology (Safran, 2003; Hill,
2013), and Buddhist philosophy (Hanh, 2017), may
help to nourish and ground the field.
I. Summary
To summarize, the REBUS/anarchic brain model30 is
derived from a synthesis of the entropic brain hypoth-
esis and free-energy principle, and particularly the
latter’s close links with hierarchical predictive cod-
ing. It recognizes that psychedelics induce an acute
state of heightened brain entropy via their action
on the serotonin system (Carhart-Harris, 2018a),
then looks to prediction coding and hypothesizes
that increased brain entropy reflects a relaxation of
the precision weighting of priors (REBUS) that coin-
cides with liberation of bottom-up signaling (anarchic
brain).
To aid the testing of the REBUS/anarchic brain
model, we propose a number of specific indices of
priors and bottom-up signaling such as the func-
tional integrity and dynamics of high-level brain
networks (REBUS) and effective connectivity ap-
plied to relevant circuitry, such as circuitry connecting
the hippocampus/parahippocampus with cortical nodes
of the DMNs. More broadly, the model could be assessed
by examining any of several aspects of hierarchy in the
brain (Murray et al., 2014; Margulies et al., 2016; Deco
and Kringelbach, 2017), with the simple hypothesis
that key features of hierarchy will be diminished under
a psychedelic.
30We treat the two components as mutually dependent, i.e.,
relaxed priors naturally imply increased prediction error.
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We also dedicate significant discussion to implica-
tions of the REBUS/anarchic brain model. One of
these is that the relaxation of priors implies that
the system’s (context) sensitivity will be enhanced—
as it will be more receptive to bottom-up information,
particularly from intrinsic sources such as the lim-
bic system. Thus, if the belief relaxation process is
combined with good contextual support, pathologic
beliefs underlying psychiatric illness, for example,
may be amenable to revision during and after a
psychedelic experience. The ideal effect of such a
belief revision process would be to make the updated
priors resonate more harmoniously with previously
hidden or silenced information. If mediated properly,
this belief–recalibration process may have long-term
positive consequences for mental health; indeed, the
described process is the very essence of effective
psychedelic therapy (Haijen et al., 2018; Lyons and
Carhart-Harris, 2018b).
Throughout this work, we have made reference
to a prominent effect of psychedelics on hierarchically
high-level priors. Although the REBUS model is not
restricted solely to high-level priors, one compelling
reason to place emphasis on hierarchically high or
deep components of the brain is the especially high
expression of 5-HT2ARs (the key target of psyche-
delics) on layer 5 pyramidal neurons within the brain’s
high-level cortical regions (Jakab and Goldman-Rakic,
1998; Beliveau et al., 2017). Collectively, these high-
level features of the brain are thought to encode
expectations and beliefs about the lived world.
Findings of dysregulated activity in pyramidal cell
firing (Celada et al., 2008), the DMN (Carhart-
Harris et al., 2012a), other high-level intrinsic
networks (Lebedev et al., 2015; Carhart-Harris
et al., 2016c), trajectories of brain states (Lord
et al., 2018), and hierarchically high-level (but rel-
atively low-frequency) spontaneous neuronal oscil-
lations (Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2013) add further
weight to the hypothesis that psychedelics have a
particularly pronounced action high up in the brain’s
functional hierarchy.
In accordance with the free-energy principle (and
with dual-aspect monism), one can view the dynamics
of high-level intrinsic networks as the dynamic or
energetic counterparts of high-level priors (e.g., see
Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010). Indeed, the DMN
itself has been described as the brain’s “Centre of
Gravity” (Davey and Harrison, 2018). The self or ego
is an important (perhaps central) high-level prior that
DMN dynamics may instantiate (Carhart-Harris and
Friston, 2010). The DMN is a particularly influential
system, sitting atop a (uniquely) deep functional
hierarchy in humans (Friston, 2018). We reason that
high-level systems and the beliefs they encode have
an informationally efficient, compressing influence
on more elemental information held and processed
below them. The high-level systems therefore function to
route or canalize thought and behavior, sometimes in an
overly constraining way that restricts self-awareness
and obstructs new learning.31 If the gravitational pull of
beliefs or behaviors becomes excessive, this can leave an
agent feeling estranged from deeper aspects of his or her
self, as well as from other people—and from a sense of
purpose and meaning in life (Watts et al., 2017; Carhart-
Harris et al., 2018b; Hari, 2018).
Curiously, psychedelics appear to temporarily breach
the free-energy principle, i.e., by relaxing priors and
increasing brain entropy for a time-limited period,
but, once the drug has been sufficiently metabolized,
normal brain function resumes and systems reset,
potentially (but by no means absolutely) in a health-
ier way (ideally), more in tune with each other and
the sensorium. We propose that mechanisms of BMS
and BMR are catalyzed by the time-limited entropic
state induced by psychedelics, such that model re-
dundancy can be minimized, and high-level priors
refined or “spring-cleaned.” The following is a first-
person testimony that speaks to the hypothesized
effect:
“It was like when you defrag the hard drive on your
computer, I experienced blocks going into place, things
being rearranged in my mind, I visualized as it was all
put into order, a beautiful experience with these gold
blocks going into black drawers that would illuminate
and I thought: ‘My brain is bring defragged, how
brilliant is that!’” (Watts et al., 2017).
Whether model reduction necessarily leaves an agent
with a robust, reliable, and refined statistical represen-
tation of the world is, however, an open question—as is
what the specific mechanics of this model reduction
process are, and how we canmeasure them in the brain.
Returning to psychology, in the previous section we
addressed a phenomenon known as spiritual bypass-
ing that can be observed among some (Western)32
users of psychedelics. Magical beliefs may be helpful
(via reducing free energy and associated uncertainty),
particularly in cultures that support this, but it is
difficult to see how the use of any belief as psycholog-
ical escape can be regarded as optimal or sustainable.
We anticipate that it may become possible in the
31One might think of the notion of the “ego tunnel” here
(Metzinger, 2009).
32One could argue that spiritual bypassing is a distinctly Western
phenomenon, as developments in scientific understanding in the
West means that (unlike among indigenous tribes for example) the
dominant culture is no longer set up to support magic. One may
choose to ignore or reject scientific knowledge in the West, but to do
so is contrary to evidence. Conversely, among indigenous cultures,
magical explanations may be the best explanations available, and
thus, no such accusations of willful ignorance can be made against
these cultures.
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future to demonstrate, via some particular metric,
how harmony between different levels of the brain’s
functional hierarchy relates to a felt psychological
harmony reflective of a well-integrated mind and
brain. Doing so may require that we look at longitu-
dinal data such as mood stability (and associated
brain activity) over months, with the prediction that
emotional escape or avoidance predicts long-term
mood instability, even after a potential initial positive
spike in mood. Although speculative, candidates for
meaningful metrics of harmony in the brain/body may
be found in the various signatures of criticality, such
as long-range correlations, nesting of oscillatory
rhythms (Murray et al., 2014), body–brain physiologic
coupling (Richter et al., 2017), and environment–
brain alignment (Lakatos et al., 2013). This notion
of harmony may also relate to a previously discussed
construct of connectedness and its special relevance
to psychedelic therapy (Watts et al., 2017; Carhart-
Harris et al., 2018b).
III. Conclusions
This paper has sought to marry insights from the
free-energy principle with those of the entropic brain
hypothesis to account for the acute and longer-term
brain and mind effects of psychedelics. We have
named this synthesis REBUS and the anarchic brain.
“REBUS” is an intentionally easy-to-remember acro-
nym based on the key theme of RElaxed Beliefs Under
pSychedelics, and the anarchic brain follows natu-
rally from the liberation of bottom-up signaling—
which is logically implied by relaxed precision on
priors. We have described how this mechanism begins
with agonist actions at the 5-HT2AR and can be
reflected in the entropy of spontaneous cortical activ-
ity. The present model significantly advances on the
entropic brain hypothesis, however, by introducing
the notion of a relaxation of the precision weighting of
priors—which concomitantly liberates bottom-up sig-
naling that, with the right preparedness, care, and
aftercare, can aid the revision of pathologically over-
weighted priors.
We propose that the REBUS/anarchic brain model
can explain the full gamut of phenomena associated
with the psychedelic experience, including the emer-
gence of previously unconscious psychological material
into conscious awareness.33 We also propose that high-
level priors confer a broad summarization of the mind
and world, effectively suppressing away (potential)
content. It therefore follows that if this suppression
is relaxed, as it is under psychedelics, content will
necessarily be released. It is an ideal of psychedelic
therapy that this newly available content be appropri-
ately integrated and assimilated into existing mental
models so thatmore of the inner and outer world can be
processed.
Importantly, we also propose that the acute brain
conditions induced by the pharmacological action of
psychedelics, increasing brain entropy and relaxing the
precision weighting on priors, are ideal for working on
the revision of high-level priors or beliefs. Consistent
with recent work on the mechanics of insight, an
entropic brain with relaxed high-level priors will be
more amenable to curious behavior and Bayesian
model optimization processes that can aid the occur-
rence of insight and perspective change. We suspect
that this template of pharmacologically and contex-
tually mediated belief relaxation and revision may
serve a major role in the future of mental health care,
potentially improving the efficacy of current treat-
ment strategies by factoring in contextual variables
when assessing the neurobiology of a given disorder
and the viability of a specific intervention (Carhart-
Harris, 2018b).
Finally, although we are optimistic about the
potential of psychedelic therapy to positively impact
on psychology and psychiatry in a major way in the
coming decades, it feels prudent to consider compli-
cations that may arise as increasing numbers of
people choose to undergo a psychedelic experience.
In this study, we wish to highlight what the scientific
model has to offer, i.e., via trial and error, forever
improving models of mind and world. If integrated
properly, psychedelics have every chance of becom-
ing a legitimate, if not lauded, tool of science and
medicine—capable of awakening us to the true depths
of our being and continuousness with nature.
“Whether by their very nature or the way that first
generation of researchers happened to construct the
experience, psychedelics introduced something deeply
subversive to the West that the various establish-
ments had little choice but to repulse. LSD truly was
an acid, dissolving almost everything with which it
came into contact, beginning with the hierarchies of
the mind… and going on from there to society’s vari-
ous structures of authority and then to lines of every
imaginable kind… If all such lines are manifestations
of the Apollonian strain in Western civilisation, the
impulse that erects distinctions, dualities, and hier-
archies, and defends them, then psychedelics repre-
sented the ungovernable Dionysian force that blithely
washes all those lines away… But surely [it] is not the
case that the forces unleashed by these chemicals are
necessarily ungovernable” (Pollan, 2018).
33Consistent with basic tenets of psychoanalytic theory and
Buddhist teaching, we adopt the position that much of the mind is
indeed unconscious and what is kept from conscious awareness can
be personal and collective as well as “once conscious—but now
repressed” or simply “never conscious.” We also maintain the
unconscious often (but not always) drives conscious behavior in the
absence of conscious awareness, in the way that a horse can steer its
rider, without the rider realizing.
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